dHEDGE audit

SherlockCode version: not recorded (see the report)

Audit competition · firm’s term: private contest

Sherlock reviewed dHEDGE (dHEDGE audit) on 22 Jun 2024: 28 findings, 0 critical; 22 marked fixed, 6 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen dHEDGE’s security record

Report hosted on GitHub.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings28

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High009
Medium0613
Low000
MediumA malicious user can delay any user's withdrawl and trnasfer by depositing minimum amount of tokenAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

MediumDoS on withdrawals when the slippage in swaps is higher than the flash loan to repayAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

MediumIncorrect implementation of the slippage parameter on withdrawalsAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

MediumLack of slippage parameters on depositsAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

MediumManager can mint performance fees even when token price decreases overallAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

MediumManager can steal up to 10% of the Vault's funds in one transaction due to slippageAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Part of dHEDGE’s security record

dHEDGE
Audits2 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Jun 2024, by Sherlock.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 2 reports.
Open dHEDGE’s security record

Security firm

Sherlock

46 projects reviewed · 67 reports · latest Sep 2026

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