Wemix Retainer 121 wepublicBank

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 121 wepublicBank) on 2 Aug 2024: 7 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 4 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen WEMIX’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low203
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `FundingProjectTreasury` the role `FUNDING_PROJECT_TREASURY_DEPLOYER_ROLE` has authority over the functions - `addReward()` - `deactivateProject()` - `setMaxRefunderNumber()` - `setTokenAddress()` Any compromise to the `FUNDING_PROJECT_TREASURY_DEPLOYER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - add reward items - set the project as `deactivated` for a refund when project is cancelled - set the number of the refunders - set the address of the NFT reward ------------------------------------------------------ In the contract `FundingProjectTreasury` the role `CANCEL_FUNDING_PROJECT_ROLE` has authority over the function `proxyCancelProject()`. Any compromise to the `CANCEL_FUNDING_PROJECT_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and cancel the project. ------------------------------------------------------ In the contract `FundingProjectTreasury` the role `REWARD_DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE` has authority over the function `distributeReward()`. Any compromise to the `REWARD_DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and distribute the NFT reward. ------------------------------------------------------ In the contract `FundingProjectTreasury` the role `projectOwner` has authority over the functions - `cancelFundByOwner()` - `cancelProject()` - `settleProject()` Any compromise to the `projectOwner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - cancel fund - cancel the project - settle the project ------------------------------------------------------ In the contract `WepublicPointV3Logic` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the function `setFundingProjectTreasuryBeacon()`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set funding project treasury beacon ------------------------------------------------------ In the contract `WepublicPointV3Logic` the role `FUNDING_PROJECT_TREASURY_DEPLOYER_ROLE` has authority over the function `deployFundingProjectTreasury()`. Any compromise to the `FUNDING_PROJECT_TREASURY_DEPLOYER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and deploy funding project treasury contract.

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

In the contract `FundingProjectTreasury`, the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the Beacon proxy contract. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

Low`rewardsToCancel`, `bulkCancelInfos` and `funderOpen

The `abi.encodePacked()` function encodes the given arguments into bytes using tightly packed, contiguous encoding. However, the argument `rewardsToCancel`, `bulkCancelInfos` and `funders` are not included as part of the signature message. This omission leads to insufficient checks on these arguments, potentially allowing malicious actors to manipulate these values without proper signature validation. ```solidity=424 bytes memory packedData = abi.encodePacked( "CANCEL_FUND", msg.sender, timestamp, projectTreasury, cancelAmount //@audit: `rewardsToCancel` not encoded in message ); require( RbacSignatureValidator.isValidSignature( wepublicPoint, keccak256(packedData), signature, CANCEL_FUND_ROLE ), "FundingProjectTreasury: invalid signature" ); ``` ```solidity=553 bytes memory packedData = abi.encodePacked( "CANCEL_FUNDING_PROJECT", msg.sender, timestamp, projectTreasury //@audit: `funders` not encoded in message ); require( RbacSignatureValidator.isValidSignature( wepublicPoint, keccak256(packedData), signature, CANCEL_FUNDING_PROJECT_ROLE ), "FundingProjectTreasury: invalid signature" ); ```

LowInadequate Check in the function `fund()/cancelFuOpen

In the function `fund()`, the `timestamp` parameter is intended to refer to the current time but lacks validation to ensure it matches `block.timestamp` and falls within the project's start and end timestamps. Additionally, there are no checks to ensure that the `rewardId` in the `rewards` array for the `fund()` function and the `rewardsToCancel` array for the `cancelFund()` function are within the valid range (Within the range of `rewardInfos.length`). This can lead to issues such as array index out-of-bounds errors.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • contracts/WepublicPointV3Logic.sol
  • contracts/FundingProjectTreasury.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open WEMIX’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us