Gelt Vault V1

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed Gelt Vault V1 on 28 Jan 2022: 6 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 1 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Gelt Vault V1’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings6

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium001
Low104
MediumRedemption Fee Precision Check May Lead to RevertFixed

The internal function `_getStrategyRedeemFeeBps` contains the following code: ```solidity uint256 redemptionFee = mAsset.data().redemptionFee; require(redemptionFee >= 1e14, "strategy redemption fee must be scaled to 18 decimals"); ``` This assumes that the underlying `mAsset` will never have a fee less than 0.0001. For example, the deployed `mAsset` contract [here](https://polygonscan.com/address/0xe840b73e5287865eec17d250bfb1536704b43b21#readProxyContract) has `redemptionFee = 6e14`. If, for example, `mStable` ever lowered the fee to `6e13`, this would still be "scaled to 18 decimals", but the function `_getStrategyRedeemFeeBps` would revert. This affects critical functions such as `voluntaryExit`.

Low`minOutputQuantity` During Redeems May Lead to Unfavorable ExchangesFixed

The function `emergencyExitStrategy` invokes `mAsset.redeem(...)`, using `1` for the `_minOutputQuantity`. If there are issues with the underlying `mAsset` contract, this may cause arbitrarily unfavorable returned quantities of `bAsset` tokens.

LowMissing Input ValidationFixed

The `initialize` function accepts a number of important contract addresses that are permanently assigned to contract members. To avoid costly re-deployments where any of these parameters are accidentally set to `address(0)`, input validation checks should be added.

LowPrivileged Roles and OwnershipFixed

Public user-facing documentation should detail the actions that can be performed by privileged users. While we don't believe the administrators have unreasonable levels of control, it is especially important to inform users that administrators are able to halt voluntary exits by pausing the contract and thus locking access to the funds.

LowUnclear `+1` Compensation in `_calcStrategyRedeemAmount`Fixed

It is not clear if the `+1` calculation is necessary in the following statement of `_calcStrategyRedeemAmount`: ``` mAssetAmount = mAsset.getRedeemExactBassetsOutput(bAssets, bAssetQuantities) + 1; // Compensate for rounding errors. ``` Note that in the deployed code [here](https://polygonscan.com/address/0xca9cf48ad534f1efa2b0f6923457f2953df86e0b#code) of an `mAsset`, the function `computeRedeemExact` already has a `+1` in the line `grossMasset += 1;` (see L2249).

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (10)

  • contracts/Authorizable.sol
  • contracts/TemporarilyPausable.sol
  • contracts/Migratable.sol
  • contracts/lib/PercentageMath.sol
  • contracts/MstableGeltVault.sol
  • contracts/lib/ECRecover.sol
  • IGeltVault.sol
  • contracts/lib/EIP712.sol
  • contracts/lib/FixedPointMath.sol
  • contracts/lib/EIP712Domain.sol

Part of Gelt Vault V1’s security record

Gelt Vault V1
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jan 2022, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Gelt Vault V1’s security record

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Quantstamp

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