Quantstamp reviewed Polymarket (Polymarket v2) on 5 Oct 2026: 8 findings, 0 critical; 6 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 2 | 4 |
Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
`validateOrder()` only validates order level state and signature data. It does not take execution specific context such as `fillAmount`, `fee`, `conditionId`, or maker side orders, so it cannot mirror the checks performed during `matchOrders()`. As a result, an order can pass `validateOrder()` but still revert during execution due to remaining capacity, fee bounds, token ID alignment, or other match specific checks.
The documentation contains stale information compared to the actual audited implementation, likely because the code changed shortly before the audit happened without updating the docs. The verified misalignments are: 1. `src/oracle/modules/README.md` states that `onArbitrationTriggered()` reverts with `ArbitrationNotExpected` as a safety check. `OptimisticOracleModule` does not implement `onArbitrationTriggered()` and does not define `ArbitrationNotExpected`. If `OracleAggregator.disputeResult()` reaches arbitration for a request configured with `OptimisticOracleModule` as the arbitrator, the call is made through `IArbitratorModule(cfg.arbitratorModule).onArbitrationTriggered(...)`. Because the function is not implemented and there is no fallback handler, the call reverts with a generic error instead of the documented custom error. 2. `docs/position-ids.md` and `docs/position-manager.md` document `PositionManager.getPositionId(conditionId, outcomeIndex)`, but that function does not exist in `PositionManager`. 3. `docs/position-ids.md` references router callback helpers that do not exist in `Router`. 4. `docs/architecture.md` and `docs/position-manager.md` use stale PMCT and `collateralToken` naming instead of current `pUSD` and `COLLATERAL_TOKEN` naming. 5. `docs/exchange.md` documents stale order fields, EIP712 domain values, initializer, constructor, fee controls, pause controls, `matchOrders` argument order, and view names. 6. `docs/modules.md` describes an old oracle assignment model. Current modules use resolver and bridge roles. 7. `docs/modules.md` lists stale bridge and OracleModule functions, and an incomplete `convert` signature. 8. `docs/router.md` has stale merge behavior, AutoRedeemer API, and omits BridgeRouter refund forwarding. 9. `docs/oracle.md` has stale auth details, and has the wrong initializer signature. 10. `docs/auth.md` omits resolver role support, overstates `InitializableRoles`, and repeats stale Exchange and AutoRedeemer APIs. 11. `docs/bridge.md` documents module support by module id, stale message types, stale payload helpers, and incorrect duplicate result behavior. 12. `docs/migration.md` documents stale migration argument shapes, stale operator overloads, overbroad revert behavior, and internal helpers as public API.
`OptimisticOracleModule` creates UMA requests using a request tuple that includes the module address, identifier, timestamp, and ancillary data. When `_reRequest()` is called after a dispute or through `forceRerequest()`, it reuses the same identifier and ancillary data, and relies on `block.timestamp` as the only value that changes the underlying UMA request ID. If two re-requests for the same condition are attempted in the same block with the same ancillary data, the second call attempts to create an already-existing UMA request. The underlying Optimistic Oracle rejects duplicate request IDs, causing the later request to revert. This creates a temporary griefing vector against admin `forceRerequest()` calls. A user can front-run an admin’s `forceRerequest()` by disputing the current price request. The dispute callback triggers `_reRequest()` first, creating a new request with the existing ancillary data and current block timestamp. If the admin transaction then executes in the same block with the same ancillary data, it reverts before applying the admin-selected bond token, bond amount, liveness, or zero-reward reset. The impact is temporary liveness degradation rather than permanent request blocking. The admin can retry in a later block, or use different ancillary data, but the failed force action may delay recovery and leave the condition on the automatically created re-request using the prior request parameters.
Structured position IDs derive their `conditionId` / `eventId` from a `baseHash`, and the `baseHash` includes the condition's original chain ID. The functions `NegRiskModule.getEventId()` and `BinaryModule.getConditionId()` hard-code the `_chainId` component of the computed `conditionId` to be `block.chainid`. For conditions that originate on one chain and are later bridged to another, the bridged positions retain their original source-chain IDs. Calling these helpers on the destination chain with the same market data will instead compute a different destination-chain ID. As a result, external integrations, indexers, frontends, or other offchain systems relying on these helpers may display incorrect market IDs, query incorrect balances/results, or build transactions against the wrong condition/event.
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