Part of CertiK’s retainer series
CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 113 Liquid Staking) on 15 Apr 2024: 15 findings, 0 critical; 10 marked fixed, 5 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 4 |
In the contract `StWEMIXV6` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - migrate the wonder - update the wonder - migrate the wonder from the exit pid - update fee - transfer Wemix coin to the owner - set treasury address - set breaker address  In the contract `StWEMIXV6` the role `breaker` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `breaker` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause this contract. 
The contract `StWEMIXV6` inherits upgradeable contracts, indicating that it is part of an upgradeable system. Upgradeable contracts often pair with a proxy contract that is responsible for managing contract upgrades. The `admin` of the proxy often has the authority to update the implementation contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.
The function `feeUpdate()` does not limit the percentage of fees applied. The fee of phase two rates could therefore be 100%. If the `feePhaseTwo` is set to `10000`, the reward will be 0 and all fees will be sent to the treasury address.
As a best practice, the `nonReentrant` modifier could be placed and executed before other modifiers in functions to prevent reentrancy attacks through other modifiers and make the code more efficient.
The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=27 address public staking; // immutable ``` - The contract `StWEMIXV6` interacts with third party contract with `IStaking` interface via `staking`. --- ```solidity=51 address wonder_, ``` - The function `StWEMIXV6.initialize` interacts with third party contract with `INCPStaking` interface via `wonder_`.
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