Petaverse PPT-Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Petaverse (Petaverse PPT-Audit) on 26 Jul 2023: 3 findings, 0 critical; all acknowledged, none fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Petaverse’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings3

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium000
Low010
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer or renounce the ownership. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/13671b3da0b045c18e821da66227c9c6/diagrams/centralization_Ownable-Ownable-_owner.svg) ---- In the contract `ERC1400` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens and add or remove a document from the token. It is important to note that the `issue()` function which is used to mint tokens requires the `_isIssuable` to be true. Since the `_isIssuable` is set to false in the `PPT` contract, the PPT Token is not mintable. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/13671b3da0b045c18e821da66227c9c6/diagrams/centralization_ERC1400-ERC1400-_owner.svg) --- In the contract `PPT` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update `publicKey`, `feeAddr`, `prosynergyAddr`, and whitelisted accounts. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/67b4f2f333074137975121c253cf9b94/diagrams/centralization_PPT-PPT-_owner.svg) --- In the contract `PPT` the role `publicKey` has authority to provide signatures for the `_transferByPartition()` function. Any compromise to the `publicKey` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and sign messages to not pay the fees in transactions.

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the PPT tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the anonymous deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the deployer account that holds undistributed tokens may allow the attacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

LowMissing Zero Address ValidationAcknowledged

Addresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. ```solidity=33 publicKey = _publicKey; ``` - `_publicKey` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=62 publicKey = _publicKey; ``` - `_publicKey` is not zero-checked before being used.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • contracts/ERC1400.sol
  • contracts/PPT.sol

Part of Petaverse’s security record

Petaverse
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jul 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Petaverse’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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