Walkup-world

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Walkup (Walkup-world) on 22 Jan 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; all acknowledged, none fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Walkup’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings4

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High030
Medium010
Low000
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `WalkupSneaker` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract and mint NFTs to arbitrary addresses. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-b685-c5e07030-921e-756244a750d5/diagrams/centralization_WalkupSneaker-WalkupSneaker-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `WalkupToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause and unpause the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-b685-c5e07030-921e-756244a750d5/diagrams/centralization_WalkupToken-WalkupToken-_owner.svg)

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeAcknowledged

The `WalkupSneaker` and `WalkupToken` contracts inherits upgradeable contracts, indicating that it is part of an upgradeable system. Upgradeable contracts often pair with a proxy contract that is responsible for managing contract upgrades. The `privileged roles` of the proxy often have the authority to update the implementation contract, i.e., the `WalkupSneaker` and `WalkupToken` contracts. Any compromise of the privileged account could allow a hacker to exploit this authority, potentially altering the implementation contract pointed to by the proxy and thus executing malicious functionality within the implementation contract.

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the WALKUP TOKEN tokens are sent to the contract deployer addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

MediumNot Recommended MetadataURI ProtocolAcknowledged

HTTP/HTTPS should not be used for token metadata because the server owner can change token metadata at will, which can dramatically affect the token value.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • WalkupToken.sol
  • WalkupSneaker.sol

Part of Walkup’s security record

Walkup
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jan 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Walkup’s security record

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CertiK

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