Wemix Retainer 48 PlayNFTMarket

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Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 48 PlayNFTMarket) on 7 Sep 2023: 30 findings, 0 critical; 19 marked fixed, 11 open.

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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings30

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High201
Medium103
Low8015
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `PlayMarketRecipient`, the roles `editor` and `owner` have authority over the following functions: - function setTokenManagerAddress(): set `tokenManagerAddress`. - function setTreasuryAddress(): set the fee address `_treasury`. - function setMaxFee(): set `maxFee`. Any compromise to the `editor` or `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change fee settings. In the contract `PlayMarketRecipient`, the role `tokenManagerAddress` has authority over the following functions: - function setRecipient(): set fee recipient addresses. - function distributionEventEmit(): emit `DistributionEvent`. Any compromise to the `tokenManagerAddress` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. --- In the contract `PlayMarketTokenManager`, the roles `editor` and `owner` have authority over the following functions: - function registerCollection(): register ERC721 or ERC1155 contract that can be traded on market. - function modifyCollection(): modify registered collection. - function modifyCollectionFee(): modify registered collection's fee info. - function blockCollection(): block a collection. - function unblockCollection(): unblock a collection. Any compromise to the `editor` or `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and manage collections. --- In the contracts `PlayMarketBase`, the roles `editor` and `owner` have authority over the following functions: - function addStrategy(): add or modify strategy to the market. - function subStrategy(): inactivate strategy in the market. - function setPriceOracle(): set price oracle contract. - function setTokenManagerAddress(): set `tokenManager` contract address. - function setPaymentToken(): set payment token. Any compromise to the `editor` or `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. --- In the contracts `PlayMarketBaseV2`, the roles `editor` and `owner` have authority over the following functions: - function addStrategy(): add or modify strategy to the market. - function subStrategy(): inactivate strategy in the market. - function setPriceOracle(): set price oracle contract. - function setTokenManagerAddress(): set `tokenManager` contract address. - functions addPaymentToken() and removePaymentToken(): manage payment tokens. Any compromise to the `editor` or `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. --- In the contract `PlayMarketEnglishAuctionOrder`, the roles `editor` and `owner` have authority over the function setMinimumStartPrice() to set the minimum price for the auction price order. Any compromise to the `editor` or `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `PlayMarketEnglishAuctionOrder`, the role `market` has authority over the following functions: - function open(): open an auction. - function offer(): place a bid in an auction. - function cancel(): cancel an auction or bid. - function claim(): the bid winner claims NFT. Any compromise to the `market` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. --- In the contract `PlayMarketFixedPriceOrder`, the role `market` has authority over the following functions: - function open(): open a sell order. - function offer(): accept a sale order. - function cancel(): cancel an order. - function modify(): update an order. Any compromise to the `market` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. --- In the contract `PlayMarketOpenPriceOrder`, the role `market` has authority over the following functions: - function open(): open a buy order. - function offer(): accept a buy order. - function cancel(): cancel an order. - function modify(): update an order. Any compromise to the `market` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. --- In the contracts `LzPlayNFT721` and `PlayNFT721`, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions: - function mint(): mint a non-wrapped NFT. - function mintBatch(): mint multiple non-wrapped NFTs. - function setPlayBridge(): set the `_playBridge` address. - function setTokenIdURI(): set the token's metadata URI. - function setBaseURI(): set the collection's base URI. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contracts `LzPlayNFT721` and `PlayNFT721`, the role `_playBridge` has authority over the following functions: - function mint(): mint wrapped NFT. - function mintBatch(): mint multiple wrapped NFTs. Any compromise to the `_playBridge` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. --- In the contracts `LzPlayNFT1155` and `PlayNFT1155`, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions: - function mint(): mint non-wrapped ERC1155 token. - function mintBatch(): mint multiple non-wrapped ERC1155 tokens. - function setPlayBridge(): set the `_playBridge` address. - function setTokenIdURI(): set the token's metadata URI. -

HighContract Upgrade Centralization RiskOpen

In the contracts `PlayMarketTokenManager`, `PlayMarketBase`, `PlayMarketBaseV2`, and `PlayOpenMarket`, the proxy admin has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the proxy contracts. Any compromise to the admin account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and control the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

MediumFunction `checkBalance()` cannot verify the receiOpen

The `Checker.checkBalance()` function is used to ensure that the token amount received by the strategy contracts is equal to the NFT price. However, if the strategy contracts have any existing token balances before the transaction, the balance check could be incorrect. ```solidity=59 function checkBalance(address token, uint value) internal view returns (bool) { uint balance; if (token == address(0)) { balance = address(this).balance; } else { balance = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)); } return balance >= value; } ```

LowNFT price can be manipulatedOpen

The NFT market stores order information, including the NFT price, in the `PlayNFTMarketOracle` contract. However, users can list their NFTs on the market for trading and can specify any price for their NFTs. This situation opens the possibility for malicious users to engage in price manipulation by paying fees and trading with different wallets. As a consequence, any protocols relying on the NFT price provided by the `PlayNFTMarketOracle` are potentially not safe.

LowNo Upper Limits for FeesOpen

There is no upper limit restricting parameter of `modifyCollectionFee()` and the maximum fee in the `PlayMarketRecipient` contract is 100%, potentially enabling up to 100% of fees on transactions.

LowNot all orders support the native tokenOpen

In the `PlayMarketBase` contract, payable functions `registerBuyOrder()`, `offerBuyOrder()` and `claimAuction()` are able to receive native tokens, but their functionality does not depend on native tokens, and the contract does not have a withdrawal function, which could result in tokens being locked.

LowOrder price is not check when registering a saleOpen

The `registerSellOrder()` function lacks of a sanity check to ensure the order price is not zero.

LowOrders in `_orderIDsBySeller[]` are never removedOpen

Opened orders are saved in the `_orderIDsBySeller[]` but they are never removed, for example, the order is completed or canceled.

LowOut of Scope DependenciesOpen

The contract serves as the underlying entity to interact with `PriceOracle` contract. The scope of the audit treats contract that is out of scope as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, those contracts can be compromised.

LowThe `cancelSellOfferBuy()` is not restricted by `Open

The modifier `nonReentrant` is not applied to the function `PlayOpenMarket.cancelSellOfferBuy()` to prevent reentrance attacks.

Show 1 more
LowThe default auction close delay is zeroOpen

An auction will end if there is no new bid after the designated close delay of the auction order. If the seller hasn't called `setCloseDelay()` to change the close delay, the default close delay for an auction order is zero. Consequently, the auction will conclude after the first bid.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (28)

  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/order/PlayMarketOpenPriceOrder.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/market/PlayMarketBase.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/IPlayNFT1155.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/manager/PlayMarketTokenManagerProxy.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/manager/PlayMarketRecipient.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/interface/IOrder.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/LzPlayNFT721.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/order/PlayMarketEnglishAuctionOrder.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/library/Orders.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/interface/ITokenManager.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/library/Type.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/IPlayNFT721.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/order/PlayMarketFixedPriceOrder.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/role/AccessControlRoleUpgradeable.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/market/PlayMarketBaseV2.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/market/PlayOpenMarket.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/ILzPlayNFT721.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/ILzPlayNFT1155.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/manager/PlayMarketTokenManager.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/PlayNFT721.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/library/Checker.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/IONFT721Enumerable.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/LzPlayNFT1155.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/order/PlayMarketOrderBase.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/market/PlayOpenMarketProxy.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/PlayNFT1155.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/tokens/ONFT721Enumerable.sol
  • projects/PlayNFTMarket/contracts/interface/IRecipient.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
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