Part of CertiK’s series
CertiK reviewed SquidGrow (Inkubate - Launchpad) on 9 Jan 2024: 18 findings, 0 critical; 16 marked fixed, 2 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 8 |
### ERC721A #### `_creator` or `_owner` In the contract `ERC721A` the role `_creator` including `creator` and `owner` accounts add has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * setMaxMintAmount() - Set the max mint amount. * setMaxWalletAmount() - Set the max wallet amount. * setBaseUri() - Set the bas uri of this token. * changeStartTime() - Change the start time of minting. * changeEndTime() - Change the end time of minting. * enableWhitelistMode() - Enable or disable the whitelist mode. * forceFinishMinting() - Forge to set the minting process to be finished. * changeMaxTotalSupply() - Change the max total supply. * setPriceForWhitelist() - Set the minting price for whitelist users. * setWhitelistRoot() - Set the merkle root hash for the whitelist users. * adminMint()- Mint NFT without any payment. Any compromise to the `_creator` role may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, set the configurations, and mint NFT in unexpected ways. #### `_owner` In the contract `ERC721A` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * setBaseInfo() - Set the base info for the token, including max supply, mint price, platform fee and so on. * setPlatformFeeRate() - Set the platform fee rate charged during minting. The `ERC721A` contract inherits `Ownable` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `_owner` also has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `renounceOwnership()` - Renounce the ownership of contract to leave the contract without an owner * `transferOwnership()` - Transfers ownership of the contract to a new account Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the base info, mint NFTs, and manage the ownership. ----- ### LaunchPad #### `_collectionOwner` In the contract `LaunchPad` the role `_collectionOwner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * setCollectionBaseUri() - Set the bas uri of this token. * changeStartTime() - Change the start time of minting. * changeEndTime() - Change the end time of minting. * enableWhitelistMode() - Enable or disable the whitelist mode. * setWhitelistRoot() - Set the merkle root hash for the whitelist users. * forceFinishMinting() - Forge to set the minting process to be finished. * changeMaxTotalSupply() - Change the max total supply. * setPriceForWhitelist() - Set the minting price for whitelist users. Any compromise to the `_collectionOwner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the configurations in unexpected ways. #### `_owner` In the contract `LaunchPad` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * pause() - Pause the contract. * unpause() - Resume the contract. * setBlacklistedUser() - Set some users in the blacklist or not. * setPlatformFeeRate() - Set the platform fee rate. * withdraw() - Withdraw the native token or ERC20 tokens from the contract. The `LaunchPad` contract inherits `OwnableUpgradeable` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `_owner` also has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `renounceOwnership()` - Renounce the ownership of contract to leave the contract without an owner * `transferOwnership()` - Transfers ownership of the contract to a new account Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set blacklist change platform fee rate, pause/unpause the contract and manage the ownership of the contract.
In the contract `LaunchPad`, the role `admin` has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the `LaunchPad` contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.
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Repository and files the report names (2)
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