Inkubate - Launchpad

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s series

CertiK reviewed SquidGrow (Inkubate - Launchpad) on 9 Jan 2024: 18 findings, 0 critical; 16 marked fixed, 2 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen SquidGrow’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings18

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High201
Medium007
Low008
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

### ERC721A #### `_creator` or `_owner` In the contract `ERC721A` the role `_creator` including `creator` and `owner` accounts add has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * setMaxMintAmount() - Set the max mint amount. * setMaxWalletAmount() - Set the max wallet amount. * setBaseUri() - Set the bas uri of this token. * changeStartTime() - Change the start time of minting. * changeEndTime() - Change the end time of minting. * enableWhitelistMode() - Enable or disable the whitelist mode. * forceFinishMinting() - Forge to set the minting process to be finished. * changeMaxTotalSupply() - Change the max total supply. * setPriceForWhitelist() - Set the minting price for whitelist users. * setWhitelistRoot() - Set the merkle root hash for the whitelist users. * adminMint()- Mint NFT without any payment. Any compromise to the `_creator` role may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, set the configurations, and mint NFT in unexpected ways. #### `_owner` In the contract `ERC721A` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * setBaseInfo() - Set the base info for the token, including max supply, mint price, platform fee and so on. * setPlatformFeeRate() - Set the platform fee rate charged during minting. The `ERC721A` contract inherits `Ownable` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `_owner` also has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `renounceOwnership()` - Renounce the ownership of contract to leave the contract without an owner * `transferOwnership()` - Transfers ownership of the contract to a new account Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the base info, mint NFTs, and manage the ownership. ----- ### LaunchPad #### `_collectionOwner` In the contract `LaunchPad` the role `_collectionOwner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * setCollectionBaseUri() - Set the bas uri of this token. * changeStartTime() - Change the start time of minting. * changeEndTime() - Change the end time of minting. * enableWhitelistMode() - Enable or disable the whitelist mode. * setWhitelistRoot() - Set the merkle root hash for the whitelist users. * forceFinishMinting() - Forge to set the minting process to be finished. * changeMaxTotalSupply() - Change the max total supply. * setPriceForWhitelist() - Set the minting price for whitelist users. Any compromise to the `_collectionOwner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the configurations in unexpected ways. #### `_owner` In the contract `LaunchPad` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * pause() - Pause the contract. * unpause() - Resume the contract. * setBlacklistedUser() - Set some users in the blacklist or not. * setPlatformFeeRate() - Set the platform fee rate. * withdraw() - Withdraw the native token or ERC20 tokens from the contract. The `LaunchPad` contract inherits `OwnableUpgradeable` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `_owner` also has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `renounceOwnership()` - Renounce the ownership of contract to leave the contract without an owner * `transferOwnership()` - Transfers ownership of the contract to a new account Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set blacklist change platform fee rate, pause/unpause the contract and manage the ownership of the contract.

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

In the contract `LaunchPad`, the role `admin` has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the `LaunchPad` contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • Marketplace-Launchpad/contracts/ERC721A.sol
  • Marketplace-Launchpad/contracts/LaunchPad.sol

Part of SquidGrow’s security record

SquidGrow
Audits16 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Sep 2024, by Hacken.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 16 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open SquidGrow’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us