CertiK reviewed Ommniverse on 5 Mar 2023: 27 findings, 0 critical; 25 marked fixed, 2 open.
The original report was removed from its address (seen 19 Oct 2026).
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Medium | 2 | 0 | 8 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 13 |
All **OMMI** tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute **OMMI** tokens without the consensus of the community.
Users can burn `ERC1155` tokens to receive `OMMI` tokens by calling the function `cash()` when the auction is ended. However, if no one initiates the `NFT` auction, or `ERC1155` are sold out, users are unable to receive `OMMI` tokens used to buy fractions of the Nft. ```solidity=211 function cash() external nonReentrant { require(auctionState == State.ended, "cash:vault not closed yet"); uint256 bal = IFERC1155(fractions).balanceOf(msg.sender, fractionsID); require(bal > 0, "cash:no tokens to cash out"); uint256 share = bal * fractionValue; IFERC1155(fractions).burn(msg.sender, fractionsID, bal); _sendOmmni(msg.sender, share); emit FractionRedeemed(msg.sender, share); } ```
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Repository and files the report names (14)
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