MAZE - audit

CertiKNot recorded. See the report

CertiK reviewed MAZE (MAZE - audit) on 4 Jul 2022: 8 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 5 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen MAZE’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from this report. Trustblock does not review code.

Findings8

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High011
Medium010
Low032
HighCentralization Risks in RoyalMasterChef.solAcknowledged

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the ownership. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/0774d84626d94484a37e7457bc84cefc/diagrams/centralization_RoyalMasterChef-Ownable-_owner.svg) In the contract `RoyalMasterChef` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the basic configuration of the project. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/0774d84626d94484a37e7457bc84cefc/diagrams/centralization_RoyalMasterChef-RoyalMasterChef-_owner.svg) The function `safeMazeTransfer()` use `rewardAddr` to send the reward. But when the balances of the `rewardAddr` are not enough, the `rewardAddr` will transfer all the balance. In extreme cases, the balance of the `rewardAddr` is zero and users can never get the rewards.

MediumFees May Be StuckAcknowledged

The function `deposit()` takes 1% of the amount as the fees. However, there is no way to get those fees out.

Low`add()` Function Not RestrictedAcknowledged

When the same LP token is added into a pool more than once in function `add()`, the total amount of reward in function `updatePool()` will be incorrectly calculated. The current implementation is relying on the operation correctness to avoid repeatedly adding the same LP token to the pool, as the function will only be called by the owner.

LowIncompatibility With Deflationary TokensAcknowledged

When transferring standard ERC20 deflationary tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user stakes 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee) in a MasterChef, only 90 tokens actually arrived in the contract. However, the user can still withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. The MasterChef takes the pool token balance(the `lpSupply`) into account when calculating the users' reward. An attacker can repeat the process of deposit and withdraw to lower the token balance(`lpSupply`) in a deflationary token pool and cause the contract to increase the reward amount. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f

LowMissing Emit EventsAcknowledged

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

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Part of MAZE’s security record

MAZE
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jul 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open MAZE’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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