Quantstamp reviewed Polymarket (Polymarket CTF Exchange v2) on 25 Mar 2026: 4 findings, 0 critical; all marked fixed.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 3 |
Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
The `CalculatorHelper.calculateTakingAmount()` function uses inline assembly to compute `(makingAmount * takerAmount) / makerAmount`. The intermediate product `makingAmount * takerAmount` can silently overflow and wrap to a smaller value when it exceeds `type(uint256).max`. Off-chain validation may restrict the range of order parameters such that overflow does not occur in practice, but there is no on-chain logic that enforces or validates this. The affected `takingAmount` is returned by `_performOrderChecks()` and is used inside both COMPLEMENTARY and non-COMPLEMENTARY paths to determine transfer amounts. The overflow requires `order.makerAmount * order.takerAmount >= 2^256`. Since both amounts are price parameters in the signed order (not a transferred balance), it is not constrained by real token supply. No scenario was identified in which this overflow could be used to systematically extract value from the opposing side of a match, if strict off-chain overflow checks are always applied to order and fill amounts.
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240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026
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