Halo Wallet

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Halo (Halo Wallet) on 5 Dec 2024: 3 findings, 0 critical; all acknowledged, none fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Halo’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings3

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High030
Medium000
Low000
HighCentralization RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `HaloToken`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following things: - `mint()`, mint tokens to specified addresses - `transferOwnership()`, transfer ownership - `renounceOwnership()`, give up ownership ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-b12f-f8263ed0-8097-99d0ce9a8aaa/diagrams/centralization_HaloToken-HaloToken-_owner.svg) In the contract `HaloToken`, the role `_pendingOwner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_pendingOwner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following things: - `acceptOwnership()`, get the ownership

HighCentralized Balance ManipulationAcknowledged

In the contract `HaloToken`, the role `owner` has the authority to update the token balance of an arbitrary account without sanity restriction. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and manipulate users' balances. For example, the attacker could also update his/her balance to a large number, sell these tokens, and cause the token price to drop.

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the `2_100_000_000e18` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (1)

  • contracts/HaloToken.sol

Part of Halo’s security record

Halo
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Dec 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Halo’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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