Grok Girl - Audit 1

CertiK1 address on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed Grok Girl (Grok Girl - Audit 1) on 26 Dec 2023: 5 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 4 open.

No open critical findings
Open Grok Girl’s security record

The original report was removed from its address (seen 19 Oct 2026).

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High101
Medium000
Low300
HighInitial Token DistributionOpen

All of the GrokGirl tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

LowERC20 Approval Race ConditionOpen

The "Approval Race Condition" is an issue in the ERC20 approval system. When an ERC20 token owner updates a spender's allowance with the `approve()` function, the spender can observe this pending approval transaction on the public blockchain. They can use the current allowance before the new one takes effect and then benefit from the updated allowance once it's approved. Possible attack scenario: 1. Alice calls `approve(Bob, 100)` to allow Bob to spend 100 tokens. 2. Alice changes her mind and calls `approve(Bob, 50)`. 3. Bob observes the second `approve(Bob, 50)` function call and calls `transferFrom(Alice, Bob, 100)` before the second `approve(Bob, 50)` call. 4. The above scenario can be achieved by front-running. In this case, Bob can transfer another 50 tokens from Alice and in total, he transferred 150 tokens from Alice.

LowPotential Sandwich AttacksOpen

In a front-running attack, an attacker identifies a pending transaction on the public blockchain and jumps ahead of it (typically by paying higher gas fees). A sandwich attack is a specialized form of front-running. In this scenario, attackers identify users making token swaps or adding liquidity without appropriate slippage limits. The attacker then profits by buying the asset before the victim's transaction and selling it immediately afterwards. The following function are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `swapRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()`

LowThird-Party Dependency UsageOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=185 AntiBot private AX; ``` - The contract `GrokGirl` interacts with third party contract with `AntiBot` interface via `AX`. --- ```solidity=194 IRouter02 public swapRouter; ``` - The contract `GrokGirl` interacts with third party contract with `IRouter02` interface via `swapRouter`. --- ```solidity=404 if(address(this).balance > 0) (success,) = marketingAddress.call{value: address(this).balance, gas: 35000}(""); ``` - The contract `GrokGirl` interacts with third party contract or EOA `marketingAddress`

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0x6d57f5c286e04850c2c085350f2e60aaa7b7c15bChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of Grok Girl’s security record

Grok Girl
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Dec 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Grok Girl’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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