Wemix PoET Retainer 52

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix PoET Retainer 52) on 25 Aug 2023: 9 findings, 0 critical; 6 marked fixed, 3 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen WEMIX’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium001
Low205
HighCentralization Risks in PoET.solOpen

In the contract `PoET` the role `_operator` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_operator` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and setting high rewards for hacker affiliated addresses and subsequently drain WEMIX token from the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-3ae5-96fbf300-80c9-97e494932dd5/diagrams/centralization_PoET-PoET-_operator.svg) In the contract `PoET` the role `_operatormanager` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_operatormanager` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change operators. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-3ae5-96fbf300-80c9-97e494932dd5/diagrams/centralization_PoET-PoET-_operatormanager.svg) In the contract `PoET` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change `_operatormanager` ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-3ae5-96fbf300-80c9-97e494932dd5/diagrams/centralization_PoET-PoET-_owner.svg)

LowPotential Outdated Library UsageOpen

The `initialize()` function of the `PoET` contract contains `__Ownable_init()` with no function argument. In the latest OpenZepplin library, the `__Ownable_init()` function contains an `initialOwner` function argument, as seen here: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable/blob/master/contracts/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol This indicates that the OpenZeppelin library being used might not be the latest one. In certain situations, this might create real problems. For example, if the deployer of the `PoET` logic contract is the same as the Admin or Owner of the proxy contract, and if the proxy contract uses the Transparent Proxy pattern that only delegate calls to the `PoET` contract from non admin / non owner addresses, then the `onlyOwner` function in `PoET` contract might be unreachable, as the proxy contract would not reach the `fallback()` function if the caller is the admin / owner address.

LowThird-Party DependenciesOpen

The `PoET` contract is a logic contract that should be used in connection with a proxy contract. The scope of the audit does not include the proxy contract itself, and this audit treats it as a black box and assumes its functional correctness. However, if the proxy contract contains errors or vulnerabilities, it may lead to loss or stolen assets, such as via upgrading the contract to allow the hacker to withdraw all Wemix tokens.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • contracts/interfaces/IPoET.sol
  • contracts/PoET.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open WEMIX’s security record

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CertiK

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