Reality NFT

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Reality Metaverse (Reality NFT) on 2 Dec 2022: 22 findings, 0 critical; 16 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged, 4 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Reality Metaverse’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings22

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium004
Low4012
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `AuctionHouse` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and drain tokens from the contract by calling function `emergencyMainExcessHandout` and `emergencyStableExcessHandout`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/57b5a7ce72b2406b8b4cd2474031a81f/diagrams/centralization_AuctionHouse-AuctionHouse-_owner.svg) In the contract `RealityVesting` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and drain tokens by calling function `emergencyWithdraw()` and adding allocation for a particular address by calling function `allocate()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/57b5a7ce72b2406b8b4cd2474031a81f/diagrams/centralization_RealityVesting-RealityVesting-_owner.svg) In the contract `VoucherPayment` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and destruct the contract and drain tokens by calling function `close()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/57b5a7ce72b2406b8b4cd2474031a81f/diagrams/centralization_VoucherPayment-VoucherPayment-_owner.svg) In the contract `TradeConfig` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the address of the fee recipient to an attacker-controlled address by calling functions `setFeeRecipient()`. In addition, attackers may add malicious contracts by calling function `supportItem()` or `supportTradeToken()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/57b5a7ce72b2406b8b4cd2474031a81f/diagrams/centralization_TradeConfig-TradeConfig-_owner.svg) In the contract `RealityPropertiesChild` the role `DEPOSITOR_ROLE` has authority over the function `deposit()`. Any compromise to the `DEPOSITOR_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens to attacker-controlled addresses by calling function `deposit()`. In the contract `RealityPropertiesRoot` the role `MINTING_MANAGER` has authority over the function `safeMint()`. Any compromise to the `MINTING_MANAGER` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens to attacker-controlled addresses by calling function `safeMint()`. In the contract `Trade`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions `emergencyNFTWithdrawal()` and `emergencyTradeTokenWithdrawal()`. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and remove any tokens present in the contract.

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeAcknowledged

The linked contracts are upgradeable contracts, and the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's consent. If an attacker compromises the account, they can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (25)

  • contracts/RealityTokenRoot.sol
  • contracts/RealityTokenChild.sol
  • contracts/trade/Trade.sol
  • contracts/trade/TradeConfig.sol
  • contracts/trade/model/TradeModel.sol
  • contracts/VoucherPayment.sol
  • contracts/trade/verifiers/EIP712Domain.sol
  • contracts/RealityPropertiesRoot.sol
  • contracts/trade/handlers/ERC1155/ERC1155HandlerStorage.sol
  • contracts/AuctionHouse.sol
  • contracts/trade/verifiers/TradeSigVerifier.sol
  • contracts/RealityProperties.sol
  • contracts/trade/Ownable.sol
  • contracts/trade/Initializable.sol
  • contracts/trade/handlers/ERC1155/ERC1155Handler.sol
  • contracts/IRealityProperties.sol
  • contracts/RealityToken.sol
  • contracts/RealityPropertiesERC20Adapter.sol
  • contracts/RealityPropertiesChild.sol
  • contracts/trade/RoyaltiesSupport.sol
  • contracts/trade/TradeStorage.sol
  • contracts/trade/handlers/IHandler.sol
  • contracts/trade/utils/EnumerableMap.sol
  • contracts/trade/utils/FractionMath.sol
  • contracts/RealityVesting.sol

Part of Reality Metaverse’s security record

Reality Metaverse
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Dec 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Reality Metaverse’s security record

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