Quantstamp reviewed PlusCoin Token on 9 Oct 2018: 3 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 3 | 0 | 0 |
As it presently is constructed, the contract is vulnerable to the allowance double-spend exploit, as with other ERC20 tokens. An example of an exploit goes as follows: 1. Alice allows Bob to transfer N amount of Alice’s tokens (N>0) by calling the approve() method on Token smart contract (passing Bob’s address and N as method arguments) 2. After some time, Alice decides to change from N to M (N>0) the number of Alice’s tokens Bob is allowed to transfer, so she calls the approve() method again, this time passing Bob’s address and N as method arguments 3. Bob notices Alice’s second transaction before it was mined and quickly sends another transaction that calls the transferFrom() method to transfer N Alice’s tokens somewhere 4. If Bob’s transaction will be executed before Alice’s transaction, then Bob will successfully transfer N Alice’s tokens and will gain an ability to transfer another M tokens 5. Before Alice notices any irregularities, Bob calls transferFrom() method again, this time to transfer M Alice’s tokens. The exploit (as described above) is mitigated through use of functions that increase/decrease the allowance relative to its current value, such as increaseAllowance() and decreaseAllowance(). Pending community agreement on an ERC standard that would protect against this exploit, we recommend that developers of applications dependent on approve() / transferFrom() should keep in mind that they have to set allowance to 0 first and verify if it was used before setting the new value. Teams who decide to wait for such a standard should make these recommendations to app developers who work with their token contract.
The token contract features the following centralization characteristic: • The owner can enable and disable transfer-related functionalities at will through the use of the isNotFrozen and isNotFrozenFrom modifier. While not necessarily a vulnerability, if the contract owner's private key is compromised or the owner becomes malicious, then token holders may be unable to transfer their tokens. This issue is magnified in that it can be performed by all super admins, not only the contract owner. In the spirit of decentralization, we recommend taking away these functionalities. The PlusCoin team has communicated to Quantstamp that the ability to freeze the token and specific accounts is implemented for AML purposes. This should also be communicated clearly to token holders upfront.
The event Burn (PlusCoin.sol L12) doesn't appear to be used anywhere and should be removed.
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