Saffron Staking V2

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed saffron.finance (Saffron Staking V2) on 21 Sep 2021: 9 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen saffron.finance’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium002
Low043
LowFor Loop Over Dynamic ArrayAcknowledged

When smart contracts are deployed or their associated functions are invoked, the execution of these operations always consumes a certain quantity of gas, according to the amount of computation required to accomplish them. Modifying an unknown-size array that grows in size over time can result in a Denial of Service attack. Simply by having an excessively huge array, users can exceed the gas limit, therefore preventing the transaction from ever succeeding.

LowIncorrect Token Deposit Logic in `SFIRewarder`Acknowledged

It is unclear how tokens are deposited to `SFIRewarder`. However, we recommend adding a dedicated function that calls `ERC20.transferFrom()` to avoid any address input error when handling the transfer.

LowPossible Inconsistencies in balance of Deflationary TokensAcknowledged

The smart contract will use the `deposit()` function to send deposit assets from the user's account to the pool. When transferring ordinary ERC20 tokens, asset transfers work as expected, and the internal account balances are always consistent with the ERC20 token contract's real token balances. However, in the case of deflationary tokens, the input amount may differ from the returned amount due to the charges transaction fee, which can result in unexpected balance inconsistencies when comparing internal asset records to external ERC20 tokens contracts.

LowRewards Can Get StuckAcknowledged

Enough `SFI` reward tokens need to be present in the `SFIRewarder` contract, otherwise, the reward payouts fail due to `safeSFITransfer` failing. As it is called on each claim (`deposit`, `withdraw`), users might not be able to claim their already allocated and pending rewards. Note that partial rewards are not paid out and the contract always tries to pay out the full rewards.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (3)

  • contracts/SFIRewarder.sol
  • contracts/SaffronStakingV2.sol
  • contracts/interface/ISFIRewarder.sol

Part of saffron.finance’s security record

saffron.finance
Audits3 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Dec 2025, by ChainSecurity.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 3 reports.
Open saffron.finance’s security record

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Quantstamp

236 projects reviewed · 332 reports · latest Oct 2026

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