Mayors

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Mayors on 28 Jun 2022: 18 findings, 0 critical; 7 marked fixed, 5 acknowledged, 6 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Mayors’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings18

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High052
Medium001
Low604
HighCentralization Related Risks in `Token.sol`Acknowledged

In the contract `token.sol` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and - mint tokens through `mint()` - mint tokens in batches to different recipients through `batchMint()`

HighCentralization Risks in `Lootbox.sol`Acknowledged

In the contract `Lootbox` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - mint a lootbox nft on any account and set its season through `mint()` - mint lootbox nfts in batches through `batchMint()` - update configuration through `updateConfig()` - transfer ownership through `transferOwnership()` In the contract `Lootbox` the role `marketplace` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `marketplace` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - mint a lootbox nft on any account and set its season through `mint()` - mint lootbox nfts in batches through `batchMint()`

HighCentralization Risks in `Marketplace.sol`Acknowledged

In the contract `Marketplace` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - update marketplace configuration through `updateConfig()` - add and set up new seasons of loot through `addNewSeasons()` - send loot boxes to any recipient through `sendLootboxes()` - add participants to buyer whitelist through `addToWhiteList()` - remove participants from the buyer whitelist through `removeFromWhiteList()`

HighCentralization Risks in `NFT.sol`Acknowledged

In the contract `NFT` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - update configuration through `updateConfig()` - transfer ownership through `transferOwnership()` - mint in batches through `batchMint()` The role `lootBox` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - mint in batches through `batchMint()` The role `levelUpgradesAddress` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `levelUpgradesAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - increase token level through `updateLevel()`

HighPotential Buy Back ManipulationAcknowledged

An opportunistic user may exploit the marketplace as follows: 1. Set an item for sale at a low price and approve the marketplace of its transfer 2. Sell or send the item away for certain benefits 3. Transfer it back through `buyItem()`

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (38)

  • contracts/lootbox/common/LootboxStructs.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/interfaces/IMarketplaceEvents.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/common/MarketplaceConstants.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC20Metadata.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC721.sol
  • contracts/common/erc721/ERC721Storage.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/common/MarketplaceStorage.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC721Mintable.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/Marketplace.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/interfaces/ILootboxEvents.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC721Receiver.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC20Mintable.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/MarketplaceConfiguration.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/LootboxLifecycle.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/common/MarketplaceErrors.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/interfaces/ILootbox.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC721Metadata.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC721Burnable.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC721Events.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/interfaces/ILootboxConfiguration.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/Lootbox.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/common/MarketplaceStructs.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/interfaces/IMarketplace.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC20Burnable.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/MarketplaceSecondary.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/interfaces/ILootboxLifecycle.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/common/LootboxErrors.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/LootboxConfiguration.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/common/LootboxStorage.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/interfaces/IMarketplacePrimary.sol
  • contracts/common/erc721/ERC721.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC165.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC721Enumerable.sol
  • contracts/common/interfaces/IERC20.sol
  • contracts/lootbox/LootboxERC721.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/interfaces/IMarketplaceConfiguration.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/MarketplacePrimary.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/interfaces/IMarketplaceSecondary.sol

Part of Mayors’s security record

Mayors
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jun 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Mayors’s security record

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