Arbitrum Token Bridge

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed Arbitrum (Arbitrum Token Bridge) on 4 Aug 2021: 5 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Arbitrum’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High001
Medium001
Low030

Marked Informational or Undetermined by the firm. Not counted as findings.

InformationalUnlocked PragmaAcknowledged

Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format pragma solidity (^)0.8.*. The caret (^) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version and above, hence the term "unlocked".

Undetermined[False Positive] Function `initialize()` Not ProtectedFixed

Function `initialize` is used as a `constructor`-like function and used to set important state variables for a contract. However, it seems to be `public` and not protected. Typically you expect some sort of modifier that checks whether the contract has already been initialized. It could be used as an implementation with a proxy that protects `initialize`, but this is not clear with the current scope of the audit. If that assumption is wrong then this is a severe exploit waiting to happen.

InformationalPrivileged Roles and OwnershipFixed

There are some actions that could have important consequences for end-users. 0. The owner of the `packages\arb-bridge-peripherals\contracts\tokenbridge\ethereum\gateway\L1GatewayRouter.sol` can call functions `setDefaultGateway` and `setGateways` at any point in time, to alter the existing token contract and gateway addresses mapping record.

InformationalUser May Lose Their Fund when Transferring Them From Layer1 to Layer2 with Insufficient Gas ProvidedMitigated

Although there is the Retryable Tickets mechanism to help retry transactions sent from layer1 to layer2 when the transaction does not succeed the first time. A user may still lose their funds when transferring them from layer1 to layer2 and insufficient gas is provided. Currently, there is no way the user can rescue those lost funds.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (36)

  • tokenbridge/test/GatewayTest.sol
  • tokenbridge/ethereum/gateway/L1ArbitrumGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/BytesParser.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/gateway/ICustomGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/gateway/GatewayRouter.sol
  • tokenbridge/test/TestPostDepositCall.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/gateway/ArbitrumGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/arbitrum/gateway/L2GatewayRouter.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/ClonableBeaconProxy.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/gateway/ITokenGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/arbitrum/gateway/L2CustomGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/ethereum/gateway/L1ArbitrumExtendedGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/gateway/IGatewayRouter.sol
  • tokenbridge/test/TestERC20.sol
  • tokenbridge/test/TestCustomTokenL1.sol
  • tokenbridge/arbitrum/gateway/L2ERC20Gateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/ethereum/gateway/L1WethGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/ethereum/gateway/L1ERC20Gateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/ITransferAndCall.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/L2GatewayToken.sol
  • tokenbridge/arbitrum/IArbToken.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/aeWETH.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/gateway/ArbitrumMessenger.sol
  • tokenbridge/test/TestArbCustomToken.sol
  • tokenbridge/ethereum/ICustomToken.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/IWETH9.sol
  • tokenbridge/test/TestWETH9.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/gateway/TokenGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/arbitrum/gateway/L2ArbitrumGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/arbitrum/gateway/L2WethGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/TransferAndCallToken.sol
  • tokenbridge/test/InboxMock.sol
  • tokenbridge/ethereum/gateway/L1GatewayRouter.sol
  • tokenbridge/arbitrum/StandardArbERC20.sol
  • tokenbridge/ethereum/gateway/L1CustomGateway.sol
  • tokenbridge/libraries/aeERC20.sol

Part of Arbitrum’s security record

Arbitrum
Audits4 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Nov 2026, by Trail of Bits.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 4 reports.
Open Arbitrum’s security record

Security firm

Quantstamp

240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026

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