Rara

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed Rara on 21 Apr 2022: 13 findings, 0 critical; 8 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged, 1 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings13

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium001
Low147
LowPrivileged Roles and OwnershipOpen

Certain contracts have state variables, e.g. `owner`, which provide certain addresses with privileged roles. Such roles may pose a risk to end-users. The `AddressManager.sol` contract contains the following privileged roles: - `ADDRESS_MANAGER_ADMIN`, as set by the `protocolAdmin` of `RoleManager.sol`: - Renounce his role and thereby disable all subsequently listed actions, by calling `RoleManager.renounceRole()`. - Change the role manager address (`roleManager`) to a new non-zero address that implements a `isAdmin()` function, by calling `setRoleManager()`. - Change the parameter manager address (`parameterManager`) to an arbitrary non-zero address, by calling `setParameterManager()`. - Change the maker registrar address (`makerRegistrar`) to an arbitrary non-zero address, by calling `setMakerRegistrar()`. - Change the reaction NFT contract address (`reactionNftContract`) to an arbitrary non-zero address, by calling `setReactionNftContract()`. - Change the default curator vault address (`defaultCuratorVault`) to an arbitrary non-zero address, by calling `setDefaultCuratorVault()`. - Change the L2 bridge registrar address (`childRegistrar`) to an arbitrary non-zero address, by calling `setChildRegistrar()`. The `RoleManager.sol` contract contains the following privileged roles: - `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, as initialized to the parameter `protocolAdmin` during `initialize()`: - Renounce his role and thereby disable all subsequently listed actions, by calling `renounceRole()`. - Grant and revoke arbitrary roles (such as `ADDRESS_MANAGER_ADMIN`, `PARAMETER_MANAGER_ADMIN`, `REACTION_NFT_ADMIN`, `CURATOR_VAULT_PURCHASER` and `CURATOR_TOKEN_ADMIN`) to/of arbitrary addresses, by calling `grantRole()` and `revokeRole()`. The `ParameterManager.sol` contract contains the following privileged roles: - `PARAMETER_MANAGER_ADMIN`, as set by the `protocolAdmin` of `RoleManager.sol`: - Renounce his role and thereby disable all subsequently listed actions, by calling `RoleManager.renounceRole()`. - Change the accepted payment token to an arbitrary non-zero address, by calling `setPaymentToken()`. - Change the reaction price to an arbitrary non-zero value, by calling `setReactionPrice()`. - Change the cut of purchase price going to the curator liability (even above 100% - see input validation finding), by calling `setSaleCuratorLiabilityBasisPoints()`. - Change the cut of purchase price going to the referrer (even above 100% - see input validation finding), by calling `setSaleReferrerBasisPoints()`. - Change the cut of spend curator liability going to the taker (even above 100% - see input validation finding), by calling `setSpendTakerBasisPoints()`. - Change the cut of spend curator liability going to the referrer (even above 100% - see input validation finding), by calling `setSpendReferrerBasisPoints()`. - Add/Remove arbitrary non-zero addresses from the approved curator vault mapping, by calling `setApprovedCuratorVaults()`. - Change the sigmoid bonding curve parameters to arbitrary non-zero values, by calling `setBondingCurveParams()`. The `SigmoidCuratorVault.sol` contract contains the following privileged roles: - `CURATOR_VAULT_PURCHASER`, as set by the `protocolAdmin` of `RoleManager.sol`: - Renounce his role and thereby disable all subsequently listed actions, by calling `RoleManager.renounceRole()`. - Buy curator tokens when reactions are spent, by calling `buyCuratorTokens()`. The `CuratorToken115.sol` contract contains the following privileged roles: - `CURATOR_TOKEN_ADMIN`, as set by the `protocolAdmin` of `RoleManager.sol`: - Renounce his role and thereby disable all subsequently listed actions, by calling `RoleManager.renounceRole()`. - Mint tokens to an arbitrary address, by calling `mint()`. - Burn tokens of an arbitrary address, by calling `burn()`. The `ReactionNft1155.sol` contract contains the following privileged roles: - `REACTION_NFT_ADMIN`, as set by the `protocolAdmin` of `RoleManager.sol`: - Renounce his role and thereby disable all subsequently listed actions, by calling `RoleManager.renounceRole()`. - Mint tokens to an arbitrary address, by calling `mint()`. - Burn tokens of an arbitrary address, by calling `burn()`.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (28)

  • contracts/Parameters/ParameterManagerStorage.sol
  • contracts/Reactions/NFT/ReactionNft1155.sol
  • contracts/Permissions/IRoleManager.sol
  • contracts/Config/IAddressManager.sol
  • contracts/Permissions/RoleManager.sol
  • contracts/Token/Standard1155.sol
  • contracts/Reactions/ReactionVault.sol
  • contracts/CuratorVault/ICuratorVault.sol
  • contracts/Config/AddressManager.sol
  • contracts/Token/IStandard1155.sol
  • contracts/Maker/IMakerRegistrar.sol
  • contracts/Parameters/IParameterManager.sol
  • contracts/Maker/MakerRegistrar.sol
  • contracts/Permissions/RoleManagerStorage.sol
  • contracts/Bridge/ChildRegistrar.sol
  • contracts/Maker/MakerRegistrarStorage.sol
  • contracts/Token/Standard1155Storage.sol
  • contracts/SigmoidCuratorVault/Curve/ExtendedMath.sol
  • contracts/SigmoidCuratorVault/Curve/Sigmoid.sol
  • contracts/CuratorVault/Token/CuratorToken1155.sol
  • contracts/Parameters/ParameterManager.sol
  • contracts/SigmoidCuratorVault/SigmoidCuratorVault.sol
  • contracts/SigmoidCuratorVault/SigmoidCuratorVaultStorage.sol
  • contracts/Config/AddressManagerStorage.sol
  • contracts/Maker/NftOwnership.sol
  • contracts/Reactions/ReactionVaultStorage.sol
  • contracts/Bridge/RootRegistrar.sol
  • contracts/Reactions/IReactionVault.sol

Part of Rara’s security record

Rara
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Apr 2022, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Rara’s security record

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Quantstamp

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