3525Lottery - Audit (Addendum)

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed 3525 Lottery (3525Lottery - Audit (Addendum)) on 6 Feb 2023: 16 findings, 0 critical; 1 acknowledged, 15 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen 3525 Lottery’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings16

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High010
Medium000
Low1500
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `Lottery` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the manager address, withdraw contract funds and modify key parameters of the Lottery contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/e1db01105345416eaf43bf0773cc2ef4/diagrams/centralization_Lottery-Lottery-owner.svg) Furthermore, the role `Manager` has authority over the following functions: * `sendWhitelist()` * `setWhitelistCode()` * `setPublicWhitelist()` * `takeWhitelist()` * `takePublicWhitelist()` * `forceBindRecommender()` * `setPresale()` * `setPause()` * `allocateIdlePool()` Any compromise to the `Manager` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify the list of whitelisted addresses, pause the contract and modify other settings. In the contract `LotteryDescriptor` the role `owner` has authority over the `registerSlot()` function. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and register new slots. In the contract `LotterySFT` the role `owner` has authority over the `setMetadataDescriptor()` function. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the `metadataDescriptor` address. Furthermore, the role `Manager` has authority over the functions `mint()` and `burn()`. Any compromise to the `Manager` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint and burn LotterySFT tokens arbitrarily. Finally, all functions in the `Arithmetic` contract were found to be privileged (only callable by the owner address), but of the `view` type.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (19)

  • contracts/interface/ILottery.sol
  • contracts/interface/IAgency.sol
  • contracts/erc3525/ERC3525MetadataDescriptor.sol
  • contracts/interface/IArithmetic.sol
  • contracts/Arithmetic.sol
  • contracts/interface/IERC3525MetadataDescriptor.sol
  • contracts/interface/AggregatorV3Interface.sol
  • contracts/erc3525/ERC3525.sol
  • contracts/interface/IERC20.sol
  • contracts/interface/IERC3525SlotEnumerable.sol
  • contracts/Lottery.sol
  • contracts/LotteryDescriptor.sol
  • contracts/interface/IERC3525.sol
  • contracts/access/Roles.sol
  • contracts/interface/IERC3525Receiver.sol
  • contracts/Agency.sol
  • contracts/interface/IERC3525Metadata.sol
  • contracts/LotterySFT.sol
  • contracts/erc3525/ERC3525SlotEnumerable.sol

Part of 3525 Lottery’s security record

3525 Lottery
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open 3525 Lottery’s security record

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CertiK

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