Wemix Retainer 119 DIOSV3 (2)

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 119 DIOSV3 (2)) on 8 Jul 2024: 5 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 3 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen WEMIX’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low102
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `UIOS` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify the `BaseTick` price which is the target price for sync operations. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-34b3-560bd0e0-9dfc-e12728e6f8c4/diagrams/centralization_UIOS-UIOS-_isOwner.svg) In the contract `UIOS` the role `_operator` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_operator` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and trigger the `WEMIX$` price stabilizing functions `syncToBaseTick`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-34b3-560bd0e0-9dfc-e12728e6f8c4/diagrams/centralization_UIOS-UIOS-_operator.svg) In the contract `OperatorManagement` the role `operatorManager` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `operatorManager` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove the operator role. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-7750-32d912c0-a7cb-27f6309f9b38/diagrams/centralization_OperatorManagement-OperatorManagement-_operatormanager.svg) In the contract `UIOSAuthorizedMint` the role `_breaker` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_breaker` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/resume the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-34b3-560bd0e0-9dfc-e12728e6f8c4/diagrams/centralization_UIOSAuthorizedMint-UIOSAuthorizedMint-_breaker.svg) In the contract `UIOSAuthorizedMint` the role `_breakersetter` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_breakersetter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set breaker role and breakersetter role. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-34b3-560bd0e0-9dfc-e12728e6f8c4/diagrams/centralization_UIOSAuthorizedMint-UIOSAuthorizedMint-_breakersetter.svg) In the contract `UIOSAuthorizedMint` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set whitelisted accounts and modify the USDC treasury address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-34b3-560bd0e0-9dfc-e12728e6f8c4/diagrams/centralization_UIOSAuthorizedMint-UIOSAuthorizedMint-_owner.svg) In the contract `UIOSDollarTreasury` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and submit/confirm malicious transaction proposals. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-34b3-560bd0e0-9dfc-e12728e6f8c4/diagrams/centralization_UIOSDollarTreasury-UIOSDollarTreasury-_owner.svg)

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

`OperatorManagement` and `UIOS` are upgradeable contracts, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's commitment. If an attacker compromises the proxy admin account, he can change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

LowRisks Associated with Unknown Implementations inOpen

When the `executeTransaction()` function is called, it executes code contained within `transaction.data`, which is not known or specified within the audit's scope. ```solidity=108 (bool success, ) = transaction.to.call{value: transaction.value}(transaction.data); ``` While the transaction requires confirmation by multiple signatories, there remains a vulnerability if one or more owners inadvertently approve a malicious transaction. Such transactions could potentially lead to the unauthorized transfer of assets or other harmful actions within the contract. This audit treats external implementations referred to in `transaction.data` as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. Given the inherent risks of executing unknown code, it is crucial for the development team to monitor these transaction contents continuously.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (4)

  • extentions/OperatorManagement.sol
  • UIOS.sol
  • UIOSDollarTreasury.sol
  • UIOSAuthorizedMint.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open WEMIX’s security record

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CertiK

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