Quantstamp reviewed Camp on 7 Aug 2025: 8 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 3 | 0 |
Marked Informational or Undetermined by the firm. Not counted as findings.
This contract mints wrapped tokens in a 1:1 ratio for native token deposits. The `totalSupply()` of this token contract is determined by querying `address(this).balance`. However, the balance of the contract can differ from the total sum of deposits if another contract forces a native token transfer using `selfdestruct`, which circumvents the otherwise correctly implemented `receive()` function. This opcode is deprecated, but currently still supported and can be used in this manner.
Running the `npm install` command to install the dependencies highlights 17 vulnerabilities (2 low, 14 high, 1 critical). This may introduce backdoors, known vulnerabilities or unexpected behavior into the system.
The README document suggests that the contract allows the batched release of matured deposits by a authorized keeper. However, the corresponding `batchRelease()` function is not access controlled, and no `keeper` role is assigned to any user. However, this function may not need to rely on a privileged user for execution, and instead may exploit the natural incentive of queued depositors to ensure smooth bridging operations.
The `CampStaker` contract has an empty `receive()` function, allowing to receive native tokens. However there is no method to withdraw any native tokens if they are sent to the contract.
The `bridgeOut()` function performs unchecked down-casting from `uint256` to `uint128` when storing deposit amounts in the `Deposit` struct. Both `_originalAmount` and `_minAmount` parameters are cast to `uint128` without validation that they fit within the target type's range. ```solidity function bridgeOut(address _to, uint128 _gaslimit, uint256 _originalAmount, uint256 _minAmount) external payable nonReentrant { // ... code ... else { uint256 _totalDeposits = totalDeposits; pending[_totalDeposits].to = _to; pending[_totalDeposits].amount = uint128(_originalAmount); // Unchecked downcast pending[_totalDeposits].minAmount = uint128(_minAmount); // Unchecked downcast // ... rest of function } } ``` If either `_originalAmount` or `_minAmount` exceeds `type(uint128).max` (approximately 3.4 × 10^38), the values will silently wrap around to a much smaller number due to integer overflow. This could result in users unintentionally bridging significantly fewer tokens than intended, leading to a loss of funds without any explicit revert or warning.
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