CertiK reviewed Jager Hunter (Jager Hunter 2) on 28 Apr 2025: 7 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 2 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 2 |
The signature verification process in the `JagerHunterAirdrop` contract does not include the chain ID and contract address, making it susceptible to replay attacks across different chains or contracts. This vulnerability is especially concerning if the contract is intended for deployment on multiple blockchains(including blockchain hardfork) or if other contracts use the same signature structure. Without incorporating the chain ID and contract address in the message hash, attackers could potentially reuse these elements in transactions across various environments. ```solidity bytes32 private constant _PERMIT_TYPEHASH = keccak256("claim(address account,uint256 amount,uint256 deadline,bytes calldata sign,bool instant,address invitor)"); ... bytes32 mHash = keccak256(abi.encode(_PERMIT_TYPEHASH, account, amount, deadline)); ```
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Repository and files the report names (3)
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