StakeStone Vault

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed StakeStone (StakeStone Vault) on 25 Oct 2024: 7 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings11

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium013
Low021

Marked Undetermined or Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.

UndeterminedContract Allows for 100% Credit UtilizationAcknowledged

The `ASSET_MANAGEMENT_ROLE` can call `AssetVault.withdrawFromVault()` and `AssetVault.repayVault()` to transfer the deposited underlying tokens to asset managers and accrue yield. However, there is no restriction to how much of the reserves can be transferred, as the contract allows withdrawing the entire underlying token balance. We would like to note that the protocol maintaining solvency relies on the asset managers used by the StakeStone team. These asset managers are outside the scope of this audit.

InformationalDonate to Prevent Token Removal From VaultAcknowledged

The `removeUnderlyingToken()` function ensures that the contract's balance for a specific token is zero before removing it from the token list. However, since it relies on the `IERC20.balanceOf()` function, an attacker can disrupt this function by donating a very small amount of the token to the contract. This will cause the balance check to fail, preventing the token from being removed.

InformationalPotential Inflation Attack During Initial DepositAcknowledged

During the very first deposit to the vault, a malicious actor could front-run legitimate deposits and donate additional funds to inflate the LP token price. This manipulation may prevent subsequent depositors from receiving the correct amount of LP tokens, effectively reducing their share. Without the Proof of Reserve (PoR) oracle implementation within the scope, we cannot assess whether this inflation attack is feasible. However, this is a known vulnerability in typical vault designs if not properly addressed.

InformationalProcess the Same Withdrawal RequestFixed

The `processWithdrawals()` function may be vulnerable to reentrancy when interacting with tokens that have callback functionality, such as ERC777 tokens. If a user crafts a withdrawal request with such a token, the request could be processed multiple times, allowing the fulfilling user to process the request multiple times. While this does not necessarily result in a loss for the protocol, it allows the fulfilling user to exploit the withdrawal process to their advantage by processing the withdrawal request multiple times.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (12)

  • src/oracle/OracleConfigurator.sol
  • src/withdrawal/WithdrawalProcessor.sol
  • src/vault/AssetVault.sol
  • src/oracle/BTCPeggedOracle.sol
  • src/token/Token.sol
  • src/withdrawal/WithdrawalQueue.sol
  • src/utils/Errors.sol
  • src/oracle/Oracle.sol
  • src/interfaces/IWithdrawalQueue.sol
  • src/interfaces/IWithdrawalProcessor.sol
  • src/oracle/ChainlinkOracle.sol
  • src/interfaces/IAssetVault.sol

Part of StakeStone’s security record

StakeStone
Audits4 audits by 1 firmLast audit Oct 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 4 reports.
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Quantstamp

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