Quantstamp reviewed StakeStone (StakeStone Vault) on 25 Oct 2024: 7 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Low | 0 | 2 | 1 |
Marked Undetermined or Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
The `ASSET_MANAGEMENT_ROLE` can call `AssetVault.withdrawFromVault()` and `AssetVault.repayVault()` to transfer the deposited underlying tokens to asset managers and accrue yield. However, there is no restriction to how much of the reserves can be transferred, as the contract allows withdrawing the entire underlying token balance. We would like to note that the protocol maintaining solvency relies on the asset managers used by the StakeStone team. These asset managers are outside the scope of this audit.
The `removeUnderlyingToken()` function ensures that the contract's balance for a specific token is zero before removing it from the token list. However, since it relies on the `IERC20.balanceOf()` function, an attacker can disrupt this function by donating a very small amount of the token to the contract. This will cause the balance check to fail, preventing the token from being removed.
During the very first deposit to the vault, a malicious actor could front-run legitimate deposits and donate additional funds to inflate the LP token price. This manipulation may prevent subsequent depositors from receiving the correct amount of LP tokens, effectively reducing their share. Without the Proof of Reserve (PoR) oracle implementation within the scope, we cannot assess whether this inflation attack is feasible. However, this is a known vulnerability in typical vault designs if not properly addressed.
The `processWithdrawals()` function may be vulnerable to reentrancy when interacting with tokens that have callback functionality, such as ERC777 tokens. If a user crafts a withdrawal request with such a token, the request could be processed multiple times, allowing the fulfilling user to process the request multiple times. While this does not necessarily result in a loss for the protocol, it allows the fulfilling user to exploit the withdrawal process to their advantage by processing the withdrawal request multiple times.
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Repository and files the report names (12)
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