Sanji Inu

CertiK1 address on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed Sanji Inu on 22 Sep 2022: 13 findings, 0 critical; 4 acknowledged, 9 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Sanji Inu’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings13

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High030
Medium010
Low900
HighCentralization Risks in Sanji_Inu.solAcknowledged

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c2c712fa46174a03a61982fc94f515dc/diagrams/centralization_Sanji_Inu-Ownable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Sanji_Inu` the role `_developmentAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_developmentAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c2c712fa46174a03a61982fc94f515dc/diagrams/centralization_Sanji_Inu-Sanji_Inu-_developmentAddress.svg) In the contract `Sanji_Inu` the role `_marketingAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_marketingAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c2c712fa46174a03a61982fc94f515dc/diagrams/centralization_Sanji_Inu-Sanji_Inu-_marketingAddress.svg) In the contract `Sanji_Inu` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c2c712fa46174a03a61982fc94f515dc/diagrams/centralization_Sanji_Inu-Sanji_Inu-_owner.svg)

HighCentralized risk in `sendETHToFee`Acknowledged

The `sendETHToFee` function transfers BNB to `_developmentAddress/_marketingAddress`. As a result, over time these two addresses will accumulate a significant portion of BNB. And they are EOA (Externally Owned Account), mishandling its private key can have devastating consequences for the project as a whole.

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the SANJI tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute SANJI tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

MediumPotential Reentrancy Attack (Involving Ether)Acknowledged

A reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. ### External call(s) ```solidity=266 swapTokensForEth(contractTokenBalance); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `Sanji_Inu.swapTokensForEth`, * `uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp)` ```solidity=269 sendETHToFee(address(this).balance); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `Sanji_Inu.sendETHToFee`, * `_developmentAddress.transfer(amount.div(2))` * In `Sanji_Inu.sendETHToFee`, * `_marketingAddress.transfer(amount.div(2))` * This call sends Ether. ### State variables written after the call(s) ```solidity=290 _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount); ``` * This function call executes the following assignment(s). * In `Sanji_Inu._takeTeam`, * `_rOwned[address(this)] = _rOwned[address(this)].add(rTeam)` * In `Sanji_Inu._transferStandard`, * `_rOwned[sender] = _rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount)` * In `Sanji_Inu._transferStandard`, * `_rOwned[recipient] = _rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount)` ```solidity=290 _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount); ``` * This function call executes the following assignment(s). * In `Sanji_Inu._reflectFee`, * `_rTotal = _rTotal.sub(rFee)`

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0xa9f059f63cd432b65a723eeeff69304fd780070cChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of Sanji Inu’s security record

Sanji Inu
Audits2 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Sep 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 2 reports.
Open Sanji Inu’s security record

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