Wemix Retainer 88 NILE MarketPlace (hybrid)

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 88 NILE MarketPlace (hybrid)) on 13 Feb 2024: 10 findings, 2 critical; 6 marked fixed, 4 open.

2 critical findings, fixed
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings10

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical002
High202
Medium000
Low202
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `HybridAuctionOrder`, `OHybridAuctionOrder` and `CHybridAuctionOrder` the role `_editor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_editor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and reset the price of an order. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-c162-76236150-a296-657bd26fd70f/diagrams/centralization_HybridAuctionOrder-HybridAuctionOrder-_editor.svg) In the contract `ExecuteManager.sol` the role `ADMIN` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify the configuration of the ExecuteManager. * setRoleManager * changeExecutability * changeExecutabilityBelongContract In the contract `GrowthRateManager.sol` the role `SETTER` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `SETTER` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify the configuration of the GrowthRateManager and affect the auction process. * setCloseDelay * setGrowthRateVersion * setGrowthRate * setCollection * setMarketType In the contract `RoleManager.sol` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify privileged roles with in the system and damage the operation of the project. * setRoleAdmin * revokeRole

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

The `RoleManager.sol`, `ExecuteManager.sol` and `GrowthRateManager.sol` contract inherits upgradeable contracts, indicating that it is part of an upgradeable system. Upgradeable contracts often pair with a proxy contract that is responsible for managing contract upgrades. The `privileged roles` of the proxy often have the authority to update the implementation contract. Any compromise of the privileged account could allow a hacker to exploit this authority, potentially altering the implementation contract pointed to by the proxy and thus executing malicious functionality within the implementation contract.

LowPotential function selector collisionOpen

The `ExecuteManager` contract is designed to manage un-executable function selectors by maintaining a map that marks certain functions as un-executable. It is worth noting that functions in different contracts could share the same function selector. Since these functions may belong to different contracts, marking a function selector as un-executable could inadvertently affect legitimate and intended functionalities in the protocol.

LowUnused owner roleOpen

The `RoleManager` contract is designed as a multiple role management contract. However, it inherits `Ownable2StepUpgradeable`, which is specifically designed to facilitate an owner role that can be granted exclusive access to specific functions within the contract. It was observed that the `RoleManager` contract does not make use of the owner role functionality provided by the `Ownable2StepUpgradeable`. The `ExecuteManager` contract shares the similar issue that the owner role is unused.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (7)

  • contracts/etc/manager/RoleManager.sol
  • contracts/NILE2.0/order/CHybridAuctionOrder.sol
  • contracts/GrowthRate/GrowthRateManager.sol
  • contracts/GrowthRate/GrowthRateV1.sol
  • contracts/NILE1.0/order/HybridAuctionOrder.sol
  • contracts/etc/manager/ExecuteManager.sol
  • contracts/NILE1.0/order/OHybridAuctionOrder.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open WEMIX’s security record

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CertiK

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