Seclab - ZESC

CertiK2 addresses on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed Zescoin (Seclab - ZESC) on 10 Apr 2023: 9 findings, 0 critical; all marked fixed.

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Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High001
Medium000
Low008
HighInitial Token DistributionFixed

Tokens are sent to `ZESC` when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the `ZESC` can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

LowComparison to A Boolean ConstantFixed

A boolean is compared to a boolean constant as shown below: ```solidity=209 require(_isTimeLockedAddress[sender] == false, "TimeLocked account"); ``` ```solidity=265 require(_isTimeLockedAddress[newTarget] == false, "Timelocked account"); ``` ```solidity=276 require(_isTimeLockedAddress[target] == true, "Not timelocked address"); ``` ```solidity=317 require(_isTimeLockedAddress[sender] == false, "TimeLocked account"); ``` ```solidity=331 require(burnFlag == true, "Burn function is locked"); ``` Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false.

LowFunction `transfer` of Contract `ZESC` Fails on AFixed

It is expected that invocations of the form `transfer(recipient, amount)` succeed and return `true` if * The address in `recipient` is not the zero address, * `amount` does not exceed the balance of address `msg.sender`, * transferring `amount` to the address `recipient` does not lead to an overflow of the recipient's balance, and * the supplied gas suffices to complete the call. Nevertheless, the `transfer` function of `ZESC` fails in some of those admissible cases.

LowFunction `transfer` of Contract `ZESC` Fails on AFixed

It is expected that invocations of the form `transfer(recipient, amount)` where the address in `recipient` equals the address in `msg.sender` (i.e. self-transfers) succeed and return `true` if * The value in `amount` does not exceed the balance of `msg.sender` and * the supplied gas suffices to complete the call. Nevertheless, the `transfer` function of `ZESC` fails in some of those admissible cases.

LowFunction `transferFrom` of Contract `ZESC` FailsFixed

It is expected that invocations of `transferFrom(from, dest, amount)` succeed and return `true` if * the value of `amount` does not exceed the balance of address `from`, * the value of `amount` does not exceed the allowance of `msg.sender` for address `from`, * transferring a value of `amount` to the address in `dest` does not lead to an overflow of the recipient's balance, and * the supplied gas suffices to complete the call. Nevertheless, the `transferFrom` function of `ZESC` fails in some of those admissible cases.

LowFunction `transferFrom` of Contract `ZESC` FailsFixed

It is expected that invocations of `transferFrom(from, dest, amount)` where the address in `dest` equals the address in `from` (i.e. self-transfers) succeed and return `true` if: * The value of `amount` does not exceed the balance of address `from`, * the value of `amount` does not exceed the allowance of `msg.sender` for address `from`, and * the supplied gas suffices to complete the call. Nevertheless, the `transferFrom` function of `ZESC` fails for some self-transfers in these admissible cases.

LowRedundant StatementsFixed

```solidity=304 function burn() external onlyOwner returns (bool) { _burn(_msgSender(), burnAmount); burnFlag = false; return true; } ``` ```solidity=328 function _burn(address account, uint256 amount) internal { require(account != address(0), "BEP20: burn from the zero address"); require(msg.sender == owner(), "only owner"); require(burnFlag == true, "Burn function is locked"); _balances[account] = _balances[account].sub( amount, "BEP20: burn amount exceeds balance" ); _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(amount); emit Transfer(account, address(0), amount); } ``` In the function `_burn()`, `require(msg.sender == owner(), "only owner");` validation checks whether the caller of the function is the `owner()` address. However, this validation is redundant because `_burn()` is an internal function and its only public wrapper function is `burn()` has `onlyOwner` modifier which already checks whether the caller of `burn()` is from address `owner()`.

LowUnnecessary Use of SafeMathFixed

The `SafeMath` library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow. ```solidity=47 library SafeMath { ``` - An implementation of `SafeMath` library is found. --- ```solidity=131 using SafeMath for uint256; ``` - `SafeMath` library is used for `uint256` type in `ZESC` contract. ```solidity=211 _approve( sender, _msgSender(), _allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub( amount, "BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance" ) ); ``` - `SafeMath.sub` is called in `transferFrom` function of `ZESC` contract. *Note: Only a sample of 2 `SafeMath` library usage in this contract (out of 8) are shown above.*

LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableFixed

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

Contracts in scope2

AddressChainSource code
0x3fef6bcf3449cdf9279e8baa152613df629e23bdChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source
0xf4aba4bcc413f38e4d8fc195a1d3bf560570bcabChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of Zescoin’s security record

Zescoin
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Apr 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
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