Wemix Retainer 46 NileMarketPlace2.

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 46 NileMarketPlace2.) on 27 Jul 2023: 17 findings, 0 critical; 15 marked fixed, 2 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen WEMIX’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings17

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium004
Low0011
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `AccessControlUpgradeable` the role `admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant/revoke roles from account. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/10b3f08082aa4e0caf7d8c9447d19ac7/diagrams/centralization_AccessControlUpgradeable-AccessControlUpgradeable-_role.svg) ----- In the contract `Recipient` the role `_editor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_editor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, `setTokenManagerAddress()`, `setFeeManagerAddress()` and `setMaxFee()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/10b3f08082aa4e0caf7d8c9447d19ac7/diagrams/centralization_Recipient-Recipient-_editor.svg) In the contract `Recipient` the role `tokenManagerAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `tokenManagerAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, call `setRecipient()` to set fee rates and fee recipients, `distributionEventEmit()` when charging fees. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/10b3f08082aa4e0caf7d8c9447d19ac7/diagrams/centralization_Recipient-Recipient-tokenManagerAddress.svg) ----- In the contract `TokenManager` the role `_editor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_editor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, call `blockCollection()` to remove a registered collection address, manage whitelist wallets, and `setGenesisGeneration()` to establish a "generation" relationship with "genesis". ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/10b3f08082aa4e0caf7d8c9447d19ac7/diagrams/centralization_TokenManager-TokenManager-_editor.svg) ----- In the contract `CurateMarket` the role `_editor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_editor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, manage whitelisted sellers, and call `setRestrict()` to set the sell order limit per seller for a collection. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/10b3f08082aa4e0caf7d8c9447d19ac7/diagrams/centralization_CurateMarket-CurateMarket-_editor.svg) ----- In the contract `NFTMarketBase` the role `_editor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_editor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and manage order strategies, manage payment tokens and `setTokenManagerAddress()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/10b3f08082aa4e0caf7d8c9447d19ac7/diagrams/centralization_NFTMarketBase-NFTMarketBase-_editor.svg) ----- In the contracts `CEnglishAuctionOrderV1` and `CEnglishAuctionOrderV3` the role `_market` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_market` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and manage the auction order. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/10b3f08082aa4e0caf7d8c9447d19ac7/diagrams/centralization_CEnglishAuctionOrderV1-CEnglishAuctionOrderV1-_market.svg) ----- In the contract `EditorRole` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and manage roles. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/10b3f08082aa4e0caf7d8c9447d19ac7/diagrams/centralization_EditorRole-EditorRole-_owner.svg)

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

In the proxy contract, the role `admin` has the authority to update the implementation contracts `CurateMarket`, `OpenMarket`, `EditorRole`, `TokenManager` and `Recipient` behind the proxy contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contracts, which are pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract to withdraw escrowed tokens from the market.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (14)

  • contracts/market/CurateMarket.sol
  • contracts/market/NFTMarketBase.sol
  • contracts/market/OpenMarket.sol
  • contracts/manager/Recipient.sol
  • contracts/manager/TokenManager.sol
  • contracts/library/Checker.sol
  • contracts/order/OrderBase.sol
  • contracts/role/EditorRole.sol
  • contracts/library/Orders.sol
  • contracts/library/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol
  • contracts/library/Type.sol
  • contracts/order/CEnglishAuctionOrderV3.sol
  • contracts/role/AccessControlRoleUpgradeable.sol
  • contracts/order/CEnglishAuctionOrderV1.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open WEMIX’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us