DCOREUM (DCO) - Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed DCOREUM (DCOREUM (DCO) - Audit) on 22 Feb 2023: 10 findings, 0 critical; 2 acknowledged, 8 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen DCOREUM’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings10

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High010
Medium010
Low800
HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

The total amount of the initial mint or `_totalSupply * 10 ** decimal()` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `_totalSupply * 10 ** decimal()` tokens without the consensus of the community. It is noted that the contract address of the `superAdminAddress` [0x6080b14E69157e8dcA7F28aB1CDbb48fd3777363](https://bscscan.com/address/0x6080b14E69157e8dcA7F28aB1CDbb48fd3777363) which the contracts from the initial mint are being sent to is a Gnosis Safe Proxy. Moreover, the Gnosis Safe Proxy only has one owner address: [0xD6Cf3A91A0ff9b7148D47E8Bd612508A811c07CF](https://bscscan.com/address/0xD6Cf3A91A0ff9b7148D47E8Bd612508A811c07CF).

MediumCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `DCO` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below: * `excludeFromFees()` - Exclude certain addresses from the deduction of fees on token transfers * `setLpAddress()` - Set liquidity pool address Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to set the `lpAddress` or exclude addresses from fees. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/66c208fb87f148588db7874649ee9fd9/diagrams/centralization_DCO_New-DCO-owner.svg) In the contract `OwnableContract` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below: * `setOwner()` - Set a new `owner` address and revoke access of original `owner` * `renounceOwnership()` - Revoke `owner` access without setting a new `owner` address Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to set owner or renounce ownership. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/66c208fb87f148588db7874649ee9fd9/diagrams/centralization_OwnableContract-OwnableContract-owner.svg)

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • lib/OwnableContract.sol
  • DCO_New.sol

Part of DCOREUM’s security record

DCOREUM
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open DCOREUM’s security record

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CertiK

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