qiibee - Staking
CertiK reviewed qiibee foundation $QBX (qiibee - Staking) on 26 Feb 2025: 5 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
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Findings5
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 1 | 2 |
HighCentralization Risks in Staking.solAcknowledged
In the contract `Staking`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer or renounce ownership, pause, or unpause the staking feature. 
LowContract Fails To Resume If Owner Renounce OwnersAcknowledged
The contract inherits from `Pausable` and `Ownable` at the same time. If the owner renounces ownership while the contract is paused, there will be no one with the necessary permissions to unpause the contract. This could result in a permanent state of pause, effectively freezing all contract functionality that is dependent on the pause state.
Contracts in scope
No deployed address is recorded for this audit.
The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.
Repository and files the report names (1)
- contracts/Staking.sol
Part of qiibee foundation $QBX’s security record
qiibee foundation $QBXSecurity firm
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