CertiK reviewed ODOM CHAIN (ODOM Certificate of title - Audit) on 8 Sep 2022: 4 findings, 0 critical; all acknowledged, none fixed.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 2 | 0 |
In the contract PauserRole.sol the role `onlyPauser` has authority over the following functions: - addPauser() - unpause() - pause() Any compromise to the `onlyPauser` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority.
ODC tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.
In function `_transfer`,the variable `from` should be verified as a non-zero value to prevent being mistakenly assigned as `address(0)` in the function.
In functions `transferFrom`, `decreaseAllowance`, `_transfer`,`_burn` and `_burnFrom`, if the value is less than the account balance, the **require** in the `sub` function will throw an exception. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.
The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.
Repository and files the report names (1)
1,044 projects reviewed · 1,375 reports · latest May 2025
See CertiK’s auditsSomething wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us