TNT

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed TNT on 17 Feb 2023: 11 findings, 0 critical; 9 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 1 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings11

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High011
Medium000
Low108
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `PassiveSale` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions below. - `setListingTime()`: Activate the listing at the current Time. - `withdrawClaimToken()`: Withdraw all the ERC20 `claimToken` tokens to the owner's address. - `addClaim()`: Add vesting information for an address. - `addClaims()`: Add vesting information for an address. - `removeClaim()`: Delete vesting information for an address. - `renounceOwnership()`: Set the owner's address to the address(0). - `transferOwnership()`: Set the owner's address to an arbitrary address. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, for example, withdraw all the tokens from the contract or remove vesting from an arbitrary user. ---- In the contract `ActiveSale` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions below. - `setListingTime()`: Activate the listing at the current Time. - `withdrawClaimToken()`: Withdraw all the ERC20 `claimToken` tokens to the owner's address. - `pauseSale()`: Disable/Enable the selling mechanism of the contract. - `setSourceTokenReceiptor()`: Set the address of the receiver of the funds. - `renounceOwnership()`: Set the owner's address to the address(0). - `transferOwnership()`: Set the owner's address to an arbitrary address. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw all the tokens from the contract or pause the sale mechanism of the contract. --- All **TNT** tokens are sent to the following addresses during the deployment of the contract. - `TEAM_ADDRESS` - `ADVISOR_ADDRESS` - `PUBLIC_SALE_ADDRESS` - `ECHOSYSTEM_ADDRESS` - `REWARD_ADDRESS` - `MARKETING_ADDRESS` ```solidity=29 _mint(TEAM_ADDRESS, 1000000000 * 10 ** 18); // Team - 10% _mint(ADVISOR_ADDRESS, 500000000 * 10 ** 18); // Advisor - 5% _mint(PUBLIC_SALE_ADDRESS, 1000000000 * 10 ** 18); // Public Sale - 10% _mint(ECHOSYSTEM_ADDRESS, 500000000 * 10 ** 18); // Ecosystem(Listing, liquidity, and partners) - 5% _mint(REWARD_ADDRESS, 6000000000 * 10 ** 18); // Reward - 60% _mint(MARKETING_ADDRESS, 1000000000 * 10 ** 18); // Marketing - 10% ``` This is a potential centralization risk as aforementioned addresses can distribute **TNT** tokens without the consensus of the community.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (3)

  • contracts/PassiveSale.sol
  • contracts/TNT.sol
  • contracts/ActiveSale.sol

Part of TNT’s security record

TNT
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open TNT’s security record

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CertiK

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