Camp - NFT

QuantstampCode version: not recorded (see the report)

Quantstamp reviewed Camp (Camp - NFT) on 5 Sep 2025: 7 findings, 0 critical; 6 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged; 1 more marked mitigated.

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Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0000
High0020
Medium0120
Low0021

Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.

InformationalDeleted and Disputed Tokens Still Receive RoyaltiesFixed

Royalties are paid out when access to associated tokens in purchased. The `_distributeRoyalty()` function is responsible for calculating and distributing the generated profit among the token owner and the parent tokens. Currently, the state of the parent token is not checked, therefore `DELETED` and `DISPUTED` tokens keep earning royalties through derivatives.

InformationalMarketplace Can Receive Native Tokens without Ability to RescueFixed

The marketplace contract exposes an empty `receive()` function that is capable of receiving native tokens. However, these tokens are then stuck in the contract, as there is no way to rescue them. Further, the contract does not require a way to receive native tokens without associated action.

InformationalParent Tagging Is Slower than MintingFixed

The dispute module allows users to accuse token owners of intellectual property infringement, and get the token blocked after judgement by the contract owner. Judgement can be cast after some cooldown period has elapsed, which allows the token owner to assert counterevidence. Disputes should then propagate to derived tokens, this is initiated by users notifying the contract using the `tagChildIp()` function. In its current form, this raises a new dispute for the child token. However, a new derivative tokens could be minted before the cooldown period of this dispute has elapsed, leading to a potential scenario where the dispute module cannot catch up with minting.

InformationalVery Small Prices Can Be Rounded to 0Fixed

During the `buyAccess()` operation, royalty calculations are applied to the price. For very low prices, and very low bps the result could be rounded to 0, resulting in empty transfers. ``` solidity uint16 constant DENOMINATOR = 10_000; function applyBps(uint256 amount, uint16 bps) internal pure returns (uint256) { return (amount * bps) / DENOMINATOR; // <-- If amount * bps < DENOMINATOR, this will round to 0 } ```

Contracts in scope

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Part of Camp’s security record

Camp
Audits3 audits by 1 firmLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 3 reports.
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Quantstamp

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