0xLSD

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed 0xLSD on 16 Oct 2023: 17 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged, 11 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen 0xLSD’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings17

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High022
Medium000
Low1102
HighCentralization Risks in OX.solAcknowledged

### Holder In the contract `BEP20_0XLSD` the role `_holder` has authority over the functions listed below. - setTxFeeExempt(): manage the state variable `isTxFeeExempt`. - updateKey(): update the address of `key`. - donateERC20(): transfer ERC20 tokens in the contract to `0xAa6CBca21980174Ac9f517a0A627156a551a2B6B`. - donateETH(): transfer native tokens to `0xAa6CBca21980174Ac9f517a0A627156a551a2B6B`. Any compromise to the `_holder` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to update the configuration of the contract and transfer assets. ### Key In the contract `BEP20_0XLSD` the role `key` has authority over the functions listed below. - swapToOX(): sign the transaction of swapping `usdt` to `0XLSD`. - drop(): sign the transaction of getting `0XLSD` from current contract. Any compromise to the `key` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and to sign transactions. ### Owner In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions listed below. - transferOwnership(): transfer ownership of the contract to a new account. - renounceOwnership(): renounce the ownership of the contract. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the ownership of the contract.

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the `0XLSD` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (1)

  • contracts/OX.sol

Part of 0xLSD’s security record

0xLSD
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Oct 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open 0xLSD’s security record

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CertiK

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