StakeHound

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed StakeHound on 7 Oct 2020: 8 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged, 1 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings8

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low143
LowAllowance Double-Spend ExploitOpen

As it presently is constructed, the contract is vulnerable to the [allowance double-spend exploit](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/blob/b4f87bb8fc25fb07f73099701e39e167a3d36465/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#L71-L78), as with other ERC20 tokens. An example of an exploit goes as follows: 1. Alice allows Bob to transfer `N` amount of Alice's tokens (`N>0`) by calling the `approve()` method on `Token` smart contract (passing Bob's address and `N` as method arguments) 2. After some time, Alice decides to change from `N` to `M` (`M>0`) the number of Alice's tokens Bob is allowed to transfer, so she calls the `approve()` method again, this time passing Bob's address and `M` as method arguments 3. Bob notices Alice's second transaction before it was mined and quickly sends another transaction that calls the `transferFrom()` method to transfer `N` Alice's tokens somewhere 4. If Bob's transaction will be executed before Alice's transaction, then Bob will successfully transfer `N` Alice's tokens and will gain an ability to transfer another `M` tokens 5. Before Alice notices any irregularities, Bob calls `transferFrom()` method again, this time to transfer `M` Alice's tokens. The exploit (as described above) is mitigated through use of functions that increase/decrease the allowance relative to its current value, such as `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance`.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • contracts/DownstreamCaller.sol
  • contracts/StakedToken.sol

Part of StakeHound’s security record

StakeHound
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Oct 2020, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open StakeHound’s security record

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Quantstamp

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