LinoSwap Ⅱ

In the contract `LinoswapV1Factory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - change the `protocolStatus` to unset all protocol fees, or to enable them during buys, sells, or both; - allow or disallow the address of a basic curve; - allow or disallow the address of a signer; - change the address of the `protocolRecipient`, this is the address that receives the protocol fees; - change the address of the `_poolTemplate`, this will change the implementation of any new pools that are created; - allow or disallow the address of a rarity value curve; - change the protocol share, which is the share of the swap fee that is allocated for the protocol fee; - withdraw the ETH accumulated from protocol fees from all pools; - allow or disallow a rarity value function.  --- In the contract `LinoswapV1Pool` the role `_factory` and the owner of the `_factory` have authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_factory` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - withdraw any NFT's held by the contract that are not in the reserves of the pool; - withdraw the protocol fees that have accumulated in the pool; - withdraw any ERC20 tokens held by the contract; - pause or unpause swaps.  --- In the contract `LinoswapV1Pool` the owner of the `_factory` and owner of the `_nft` have authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - change the royalty status to take royalties on buys, sells, both, or neither; - change the royalty receiver info, which allows them to set what addresses will receive royalties and the share for each address.  --- In the contract `LinoswapV1Pool` any signer that is allowed can provide any `liquidityNFT.liquidityNFTIDs` and `liquidityNFT.rarityRankPercentageNFTIDs` as inputs. Any compromise to an allowed signer may allow the hacker to take advantage of this and manipulate the `rarityRankPercentage` of the `NFTIDs` so that they are either more rare than they should be and thus overvalued, or they are less rare than they should be and thus are undervalued.