Alchemy Light Account

QuantstampRepository at commit aa8196b

Quantstamp reviewed Alchemy ERC (Alchemy Light Account) on 27 Sep 2023: 7 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged, 2 open.

No open critical findings
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Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low232
LowBundler May Drop UserOps if the `owner` of LightAccount Violates ERC-4337's Validation Requirements in `isValidSignature()`Open

The `LightAccount` wallet supports user operations validation by either EOA or [`ERC-1271`](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1271) signature validation method. It is important to note that the ERC-1271 signature validation only works when the `owner` of the wallet supports `ERC-1271`. According to the `ERC-1271` standard: > `isValidSignature` can call arbitrary methods to validate a given signature, which could be context dependent (e.g. time based or state based), EOA dependent (e.g. signers authorization level within smart wallet), signature scheme Dependent (e.g. ECDSA, multisig, BLS), etc. Therefore, a contract that supports `ERC-1271` may read storage or the current blockchain state to determine the validity of a signature. However, the usage of `ERC-1271` for the validation of user operations may have specific limitations due to the restrictions of opcode banning and storage access outlined in the [`ERC-4337`](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337) standard. Specifically, during the validation phase, wallets are not allowed to use any forbidden opcodes, including `TIMESTAMP` and `NUMBER`. Additionally, storage access is restricted to self-storage or storage associated with the wallet's address. This restriction prevents `ERC-1967` proxies from being an owner of a `LightAccount`, as they access a constant implementation slot not associated with the wallet. These restrictions also mean that violating the storage access rule on the `owner` would lead to bundlers dropping the UserOps that are sent to the `owner`'s light account. While typically, this is recoverable by directly operating on the `owner` smart contract itself, it may not be the expected behavior. There is also the possibility of not being able to recover if the `owner` smart contract is not well designed. Furthermore, the `LightAccount.isValidSignature()` function cannot be used for user operation validation since `LightAccount` is deployed as an `ERC-1967` proxy and implements a customized storage slot pattern that triggers a storage access violation when the wallet attempts to read its `owner`.

LowCritical Role Transfer Not Following Two-Step PatternOpen

In the `LightAccount` wallet, the `owner` can transfer their ownership to another address through the `transferOwnership()` function. This transfer of ownership can occur either directly or by `ERC-4337` user operations. However, the wallet can lose ownership if the `newOwner` address is accidentally provided as an uncontrollable address or a smart contract that does not support `ERC-1271`. As a result, all user operations to the wallet will fail during the validation phase, effectively making the wallet unusable.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (3)

  • https://github.com/alchemyplatform/light-account/src/CustomSlotInitializable.sol at commit aa8196bf925c32aa3fe48b8f582ce399d0ffd73a
  • https://github.com/alchemyplatform/light-account/src/LightAccount.sol at commit aa8196bf925c32aa3fe48b8f582ce399d0ffd73a
  • https://github.com/alchemyplatform/light-account/src/LightAccountFactory.sol at commit aa8196bf925c32aa3fe48b8f582ce399d0ffd73a

Part of Alchemy ERC’s security record

Alchemy ERC
Audits6 audits by 1 firmLast audit May 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 6 reports.
Open Alchemy ERC’s security record

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Quantstamp

236 projects reviewed · 332 reports · latest Oct 2026

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