W Coin Migration Audit

QuillAuditsFiles named in the report

Audit · firm’s term: audit

QuillAudits reviewed W Chain (W Coin Migration Audit) on 25 Dec 2024: 5 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 1 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen W Chain’s security record

Report hosted on quillaudits.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium001
Low103
MediumRisk of DOS due to signer array becoming very largeFixed

The addSigner function contains a potential Denial of Service (DOS) vulnerability due to an unbounded array of signers. The function performs a linear search through the _signersarray to check for duplicates before adding a new signer. As the number of signers grows, the gas cost of this operation increases linearly, potentially making the function unusable if the array becomes too large.The issue is present in two locations:1. The addSigner function's duplicate check loop 2. The removeSigner function's search loop This could lead to: - Excessive gas consumption for signer management operations - Function calls potentially exceeding the block gas limit- Contract becoming unusable if too many signers are added

LowCEI pattern is not followedFixed

The claim function violates the Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) pattern by performing an external call (transfer) before updating the contract's state variables. This creates a potential reentrancy vulnerability where an attacker could re-enter the contract before state changes are applied.

LowImmutable chainId can be problematic in case of hard forkFixed

Using an immutable chainId in the contract poses a risk during network hard forks. When a network undergoes a hard fork, it can result in two separate chains with different chainIds. If the contract's chainId is immutable (hardcoded), the contract will continue to operate with the original chainId.

LowUse call instead of transferFixed

The claim function uses the deprecated transfer() method to send ETH to users. Thetransfer() function forwards a fixed gas stipend of 2300 gas, which can cause the transaction to fail if the recipient is a smart contract with complex logic in its receive/fallback functions.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (1)

  • WChainMigration.sol

Part of W Chain’s security record

W Chain
Audits4 audits by 1 firmLast audit Dec 2024, by QuillAudits.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 4 reports.
Open W Chain’s security record

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