0xLSD security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, 0xLSD has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 16 Oct 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
Findings17
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 11 | 0 | 2 |
HighCentralization Risks in OX.sol0xLSD · CertiK · 16 Oct 2023Acknowledged
### Holder In the contract `BEP20_0XLSD` the role `_holder` has authority over the functions listed below. - setTxFeeExempt(): manage the state variable `isTxFeeExempt`. - updateKey(): update the address of `key`. - donateERC20(): transfer ERC20 tokens in the contract to `0xAa6CBca21980174Ac9f517a0A627156a551a2B6B`. - donateETH(): transfer native tokens to `0xAa6CBca21980174Ac9f517a0A627156a551a2B6B`. Any compromise to the `_holder` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to update the configuration of the contract and transfer assets. ### Key In the contract `BEP20_0XLSD` the role `key` has authority over the functions listed below. - swapToOX(): sign the transaction of swapping `usdt` to `0XLSD`. - drop(): sign the transaction of getting `0XLSD` from current contract. Any compromise to the `key` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and to sign transactions. ### Owner In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions listed below. - transferOwnership(): transfer ownership of the contract to a new account. - renounceOwnership(): renounce the ownership of the contract. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the ownership of the contract.
Open the reportHighInitial Token Distribution0xLSD · CertiK · 16 Oct 2023Acknowledged
All of the `0XLSD` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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