3525 Lottery security record

Ethereum, Polygon (POS)3525lottery.com

As of 3 Nov 2026, 3525 Lottery has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 6 Feb 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.

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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits1

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AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
3525Lottery - Audit (Addendum)Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com

Findings16

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High010
Medium000
Low1500
HighCentralization Related Risks3525Lottery - Audit (Addendum) · CertiK · 6 Feb 2023Acknowledged

In the contract `Lottery` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the manager address, withdraw contract funds and modify key parameters of the Lottery contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/e1db01105345416eaf43bf0773cc2ef4/diagrams/centralization_Lottery-Lottery-owner.svg) Furthermore, the role `Manager` has authority over the following functions: * `sendWhitelist()` * `setWhitelistCode()` * `setPublicWhitelist()` * `takeWhitelist()` * `takePublicWhitelist()` * `forceBindRecommender()` * `setPresale()` * `setPause()` * `allocateIdlePool()` Any compromise to the `Manager` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify the list of whitelisted addresses, pause the contract and modify other settings. In the contract `LotteryDescriptor` the role `owner` has authority over the `registerSlot()` function. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and register new slots. In the contract `LotterySFT` the role `owner` has authority over the `setMetadataDescriptor()` function. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the `metadataDescriptor` address. Furthermore, the role `Manager` has authority over the functions `mint()` and `burn()`. Any compromise to the `Manager` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint and burn LotterySFT tokens arbitrarily. Finally, all functions in the `Arithmetic` contract were found to be privileged (only callable by the owner address), but of the `view` type.

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