As of 3 Nov 2026, A3S Protocol has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 2 Sep 2022. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
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| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A3S protocol | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 8 | 0 |
In the contract `A3SWalletFactory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. - function `updateBaseMetaURI()`, to update the NFT base URI. - function `updateWhilelistAddress()`, to update the whitelist validation contract. - function `updateFee()`, to update the NFT mint fees. - function `withdrawEther()`, to withdraw ether from this contract. - function `withdrawToken()`, to withdraw `fiatToken` ERC20 tokens from this contract. - function `UUPSUpgradeable.upgradeTo()`, to upgrade this contract to a new contract. - function `UUPSUpgradeable.upgradeToAndCall()`, to upgrade this contract to a new contract and call a function of the new contract. 
Open the reportIn the contract `MerkleWhitelist` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. - function `updateExecutor()`, to update the `executor` address, which has permission to update the Merkle root hash. - function `updateRootHash()`, to update the Merkle root hash and change the whitelist user list. - function `updateFactory()`, to update the `factory` contract address, which has permission to call the `claimWhitelist()` function. - function `updateRound()`, to increase round. If the NFT minting is limited, the whitelisted users can mint one NFT in a new round. - function `updateIsLimited()`, to enable/disable limited NFT minting.  In the contract `MerkleWhitelist` the role `executor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `executor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. - function `updateRootHash()`, to update the Merkle root hash and change the whitelist user list.  In the contract `MerkleWhitelist` the role `factory` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `factory` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. - function `claimWhitelist()`. The `factory` contract will call this function to check if the user has permission to mint NFT. 
Open the report`A3SWalletFactory` is an upgradeable contract, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's commitment. If an attacker compromises the account, he can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.
Open the reportIf `isLimited` is true, the `owner` is on the whitelist, and `round` is zero, the mintable status will be 1. In this case, the user can not mint NFT in the zero round, so the mintable status should be zero. ```solidity=57 if (isLimited) { if (isWhitelisted(owner, proof)) { if (claimedWhitelist[owner] == round) { status = 1; } else { status = 2; } } } else { status = 3; } ```
Open the report`public` functions that are never called by the contract could be declared as `external`. `external` functions are more efficient than `public` functions.
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Open the reportAddresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses. ```solidity=28 factory = factoryAddress; ``` - `factoryAddress` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=41 (bool success, bytes memory returnData) = payable( address(contractAddress) ).call{value: amount}(payload); ``` - `contractAddress` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=133 whilelistAddress = whitelistContract; ``` - `whitelistContract` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=144 fiatToken = token; ``` - `token` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=27 executor = executorAddress; ``` - `executorAddress` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=39 factory = factoryAddress; ``` - `factoryAddress` is not zero-checked before being used.
Open the reportNodes process view function call locally, and each node may limit the execution time. If the value of `tokenIdCounter` is very large, the call to view function `walletListOwnerOf()` takes too long and may fail. ```solidity=218 for (; id <= tokenIdCounter.current(); id++) { if (ownerOf(id) == owner) { results[count] = walletOf(id); count++; } } ```
Open the reportA local variable is shadowing another component defined elsewhere. ```solidity=50 function isMintable(address owner, bytes32[] calldata proof) ``` - Local variable `owner` in `MerkleWhitelist.isMintable` shadows the function `owner` in `Ownable`. --- ```solidity=72 function isWhitelisted(address owner, bytes32[] calldata proof) ``` - Local variable `owner` in `MerkleWhitelist.isWhitelisted` shadows the function `owner` in `Ownable`. --- ```solidity=81 function claimWhitelist(address owner, bytes32[] calldata proof) external { ``` - Local variable `owner` in `MerkleWhitelist.claimWhitelist` shadows the function `owner` in `Ownable`.
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third-party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third-party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. ```solidity=37 address public fiatToken; ``` - The contract `A3SWalletFactory` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20Upgradeable` interface via `fiatToken`.
Open the reportThe return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=77 IERC20Upgradeable(fiatToken).transferFrom( msg.sender, address(this), fiatTokenFee ); ``` --- ```solidity=165 IERC20Upgradeable(fiatToken).transfer(owner(), amount); ```
Open the report```solidity=17 event GeneralCall(address indexed contractAddress, bytes indexed payload); ``` - `GeneralCall` is declared in `A3SWallet` but never emitted.
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