Anryton security record
As of 27 Oct 2026, Anryton has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by QuillAudits, dated 2 Nov 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anryton | Security firm: QuillAudits | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · quillaudits.com |
Findings10
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 2 |
HighRounding error issueAnryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
In contract stake, if user stakes or vests the tokens and after the cliff period tries to unstake/withdraw the tokens, then user will get less than what is expected because of the rounding error caused by getMaturedStakeAmt() and _vesting() functionality.In getMaturedStakedAmt() function, line uint256 unStakePerMonth = userStaking.stakeAmount / 6 Where the staked amount is divided by 6, causing rounding of the value Also, in _vesting function in loops _amount+=_userDeposit.depositAmount / 12 which is either divided by 12 or 24 according to sale, causes a rounding issue. For example, if the user stakes 100 tokens and after a cliff period of 6 months tries to unstake then 100/6 = 16.6666666, but because solidity does not support decimal values, it’ll be rounded to 16 for 6 months, it’ll be 16*6 = 96, causing loss of 4 tokens.
Open the reportHighUser can only unstake onceAnryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
From issue A1. we can say that if a user did un-stake tokens for 17 months in one call then wants to un-stake remaining tokens but he won’t be able to due to “Arithmetic over/underflow”. The line stakings[_user][i].unStakedAmount += uint160(releaseAmount) stores the both 1st withdrawal and 2 withdrawal values which makes it greater what actual amount is and then causes arithmetic over/underflow issue while subtracting.
Open the reportHighView functions vesting() and getMaturedStakeAmt() give different matured token amounts than the actual transferred amount in withdraw() and _unStakeTokens().Anryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
vesting() and getMaturedStakeAmt() functions let users know how many tokens they are going to receive if they call withdraw() and _unStakeTokens() (via unStakeOrLock()), respectively. However, the amount returned by these view functions differs vastly from what is transferred by state-changing functions.
Open the reportHighwithdraw() transfers same number of tokens after 40 seconds(>7*5) as transferred after 215 seconds(>42*5)Anryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
The number of tokens transferred between the 7 to 42 months is the same as transferred after completion of 42 months tenure.
Open the reportHighWrong _maturedAmt calculation while un-staking and withdrawing tokens.Anryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
In Stake contract when user tries to un-stake the amount it is calculated over the period of 13 to 18 months after locking(stake for) of 12 months. But for the unstakeTokens() function when called for 13-17 months the amount released is correct but for the 18th month it does not calculate the values correctly.
Open the reportHighWrong age calculation in _calcMarketting()Anryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
Every time _m is greater than 18 then age=1, the rest of the conditions are skipped.
Open the reportHighWrong total supply valueAnryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
In the token contract Anryton according to the whitepaper the total supply is 400 million, but in the contract only 75 million is mentioned. Also, the variable is constant so it won’t be possible to change or mint more tokens as the mint function checks if the tokens minted are more than 75 million
Open the reportMediumString length comparison in _compareEqual() will lead to more number of tokens withdrawn than intended.Anryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
_vesting() function compares the sale name for determining _amount, which is calculated twice if the sale name is either “ADVISORS” or “RESERVES”, which have equal lengths so both conditions become True.1st Condition: https://github.com/kuldeep349/anrytonContract/blob/ec82637f71d95a9ae854f3ed5aa0ed458f5f22ca/0x6CB0c296F81175DE85Ab2b24359E0D25195Bd317/Stake.sol#L5132nd Condition: https://github.com/kuldeep349/anrytonContract/blob/ec82637f71d95a9ae854f3ed5aa0ed458f5f22ca/0x6CB0c296F81175DE85Ab2b24359E0D25195Bd317/Stake.sol#L522
Open the reportLowgetLeftBalance() returns the wrong balance.Anryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
staked and locked tokens need not be subtracted from the token balance as the deposited balance does not have any relation with staked and locked tokens.
Open the reportLowIn _lockTokens() wrong address is being used for totalLocks.Anryton · QuillAudits · 2 Nov 2023Fixed
totalLocks of _to address should be used as locking of _to address’s token takes place.
Open the reportContracts
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