Apeiron security record

Ethereum, Polygon (POS)apeironnft.comGitHub

As of 14 Oct 2026, Apeiron has 3 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 4 Nov 2022. Those reports list no open critical findings.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
Across 3 reports.
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Statuses are the security firms’ own. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits3

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
Apeiron - Sanctuary ContractSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com
ApeIron - Token ContractSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the report2 open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com
ApeIron - Audit 3Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com

Findings19

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High060
Medium002
Low1010
HighCentralization Risks in ApeironPlanet.solApeiron - Sanctuary Contract · CertiK · 4 Nov 2022Acknowledged

In the contract `ApeironPlanet` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and burn all NFTs by calling the function `burn()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/d7ab32c1d8ff47a38461659ae7b70fae/diagrams/centralization_ApeironPlanet-ApeironPlanet-_owner.svg)

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HighCentralization Risks in ApeironPlanetPresaleFactoApeiron - Sanctuary Contract · CertiK · 4 Nov 2022Acknowledged

In the contract `ApeironPlanetPresaleFactory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw all funds by calling the function withdrawFunds(). ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/d7ab32c1d8ff47a38461659ae7b70fae/diagrams/centralization_ApeironPlanetPresaleFactory-ApeironPlanetPresaleFactory-_owner.svg)

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HighCentralization Risks in BreedPlanet.solApeiron - Sanctuary Contract · CertiK · 4 Nov 2022Acknowledged

In the contract `BreedPlanet` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the prices of token Aprs and token Anima to zero. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/d7ab32c1d8ff47a38461659ae7b70fae/diagrams/centralization_BreedPlanet-BreedPlanet-_owner.svg)

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeApeiron - Sanctuary Contract · CertiK · 4 Nov 2022Acknowledged

Since these contracts are upgradeable, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's consent. If an attacker compromises the account, he/she can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

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HighCentralization Risks in `MarketPlace1155.sol`, `MApeIron - Audit 3 · CertiK · 11 Oct 2022Acknowledged

In the contract `MarketPlace.sol` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: * Upgrade the current contract's implementation to any new implementation set by the `_owner`, with function `_authorizeUpgrade()`. * Set the `tokenReceiptHandler` address to any contract address, with function `setupTokenReceiptContracts()`. The `tokenReceiptHandler` contract is in charge of creating and burning receipts when an ERC721 token ID is listed, purchased or cancelled. * Set the `blacklist` address to any contract address, with function `setupBlacklistContracts()`. The `blacklist` contract is in charge of blacklisting specific users and their tokens from being listed in the `MarketPlace.sol` contract. * Set the `platformFeePercent` to any value, with function `setPlatformFeePercent()`. The `platformFeePercent` is the percent fee taken from the seller after their listing was purchased, and this fee is sent to the `payoutWalletAddress`. * Set the `payoutWalletAddress` to any address, with function `setPlatformFeePayoutWalletAddress()`. The `payoutWalletAddress` receives selling fees according to the percent set by `platformFeePercent`. * Set the allowed ERC20 tokens to be used to purchase the listed ERC721 token IDs, with function `setApprovedPurchaseTokenAddresses()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/dbb43e36029b473f965df21c41d43d27/diagrams/centralization_MarketPlace-MarketPlace-_owner.svg) --- In the contract `MarketPlace1155.sol` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: * Upgrade the current contract's implementation to any new implementation set by the `_owner`, with function `_authorizeUpgrade()`. * Set the `tokenReceiptHandler` address to any contract address, with function `setupTokenReceiptContracts()`. The `tokenReceiptHandler` contract is in charge of creating and burning receipts when an ERC1155 token ID is listed, purchased or cancelled. * Set the `blacklist` address to any contract address, with function `setupBlacklistContracts()`. The `blacklist` contract is in charge of blacklisting specific users and their tokens from being listed in the `MarketPlace1155.sol` contract. * Set the `platformFeePercent` to any value, with function `setPlatformFeePercent()`. The `platformFeePercent` is the percent fee taken from the seller after their listing was purchased, and this fee is sent to the `payoutWalletAddress`. * Set the `payoutWalletAddress` to any address, with function `setPlatformFeePayoutWalletAddress()`. The `payoutWalletAddress` receives selling fees according to the percent set by `platformFeePercent`. * Set the allowed ERC20 tokens to be used to purchase the listed ERC1155 token IDs, with function `setApprovedPurchaseTokenAddresses()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/dbb43e36029b473f965df21c41d43d27/diagrams/centralization_MarketPlace1155-MarketPlace1155-_owner.svg) --- In the contract `Blacklist.sol` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions: * `setAdmin()` * `_authorizeUpgrade()` Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: * Upgrade the current contract's implementation to any new implementation set by the `_owner`, with function `_authorizeUpgrade()`. * Add/Remove any address from the `admin` role, with function `setAdmin()`. The `admin` role has privildeged access to the functions described below. --- In the contract `Blacklist.sol` the role `admin` has authority over the functions: * `blacklistNFTs()` * `setDisabled()` Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: * Blacklist the following from being listed on `MarketPlace.sol` or `MarketPlace1155.sol`, with function `blacklistNFTs()`: * A specific users NFT/ERC1155 token IDs. * All of the users tokens for a specific NFT/ERC1155. * All of the users tokens from all NFT/ERC1155. * Enable/Disable the contract's functionality of preventing users and their tokens from being listed on `MarketPlace.sol` or `MarketPlace1155.sol`, with function `setDisabled()`.

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeApeIron - Audit 3 · CertiK · 11 Oct 2022Acknowledged

The linked contracts are upgradeable contracts, and the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's consent. If an attacker compromises the account, they can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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The repositories and files the reports name

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