ApxUSD security record

Arbitrumapyx.fiX

As of 19 Nov 2026, ApxUSD has 4 audit reports by 3 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 30 Apr 2026. Those reports list no open critical findings.

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Across the 4 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits4

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsSource
Apyx – ApxUSD, ApyUSD, Bridged TokenSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files listedNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
ApxUSD StablecoinSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
Apyx apxUSDSecurity firm: CertoraDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
Apyx StablecoinSecurity firm: ZellicDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the report1 critical finding, fixedGitHub ↗

Findings40

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0010
High0020
Medium0260
Low02133

The firm marks these findings Mitigated. They are not counted as open, acknowledged or fixed.

Low`ApyUSD.setUnlockToken()` Accepts Incompatible Replacements and Can Brick WithdrawalsApyx – ApxUSD, ApyUSD, Bridged Token · Quantstamp · 30 Apr 2026Mitigated

`ApyUSD.setUnlockToken()` only checks for a nonzero address. It does not verify that the replacement contract was deployed for the active vault or for the correct underlying asset. This is dangerous because the withdrawal path assumes the configured contract is a compatible `UnlockToken`. A mismatched replacement can make every `withdraw()` and `redeem()` revert once `ApyUSD` reaches the external deposit/request path. A single bad admin rotation can brick the entire exit path for current and future vault users until the pointer is corrected.

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Low`setSupplyCap` Carries No Mandatory Delay and No Cap Parity Enforcement, Creating a CCIP Lane-Block ConditionApyx – ApxUSD, ApyUSD, Bridged Token · Quantstamp · 30 Apr 2026Mitigated

When `BridgedApyxToken.mint()` is called by the CCIP pool, and the incoming amount would push `totalSupply` past `$.supplyCap`, the function reverts: ```solidity // src/bridge/BridgedApyxToken.sol:161-168 function mint(address account, uint256 amount) external onlyCCIPPool { BridgedApyxTokenStorage storage $ = _getStorage(); uint256 currentSupply = totalSupply(); if (currentSupply + amount > $.supplyCap) { revert SupplyCapExceeded(amount, $.supplyCap - currentSupply); } _mint(account, amount); } ``` Chainlink's CCIP `OffRamp` processes messages in strict sequence per lane. When a `mint()` call reverts, Chainlink's Smart Execution automation retries the failing message automatically for approximately 8 hours. During this entire window, every subsequent message on the same lane, regardless of sender, recipient, or amount, is blocked behind the stuck message. After the automatic retry window expires, the message remains in the queue indefinitely; a manual call to `manuallyExecute` on the `OffRamp` is required to unblock the lane, and only after the root cause (the supply cap violation) is resolved. This scenario can be triggered by either of two paths: 1. **Direct cap reduction:** `ADMIN_ROLE` calls `setSupplyCap()` on a `BridgedApyxToken` deployment with a value below the corresponding mainnet supply cap. If in-flight bridge messages carry amounts that would exceed the new, lower cap, the next `mint()` call reverts and the lane blocks. 2. **Mainnet cap increase without a bridged supply cap update:** If the mainnet `ApxUSD` supply cap is raised (to accommodate new collateral) without a corresponding increase to the destination-chain `BridgedApyxToken` supply cap, the bridged supply cap becomes the binding constraint. Users bridging amounts that would otherwise be permitted under the mainnet cap will encounter a `mint()` revert on the destination chain. The `IBridgedToken` NatSpec identifies both risks and makes two mitigation recommendations: ```solidity /// The cap SHOULD match the mainnet supply cap for the corresponding token. /// ... /// A delay on this function SHOULD be configured in the AccessManager to provide /// an observation window before any cap change takes effect. ``` Neither recommendation is enforced on-chain. `BridgeRoles.assignAdminTargetsFor()` assigns `setSupplyCap` to `ADMIN_ROLE` with no execution delay. `setTargetFunctionRole()` with no preceding `setTargetFunctionDelay()` call configures zero execution delay. A cap reduction takes effect in the same block it is submitted, with no observation window for operators to clear any in-flight bridge messages before the new cap becomes active.

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Low`_decimalsOffset()` in `ApyUSD` Enables `ERC-4626` First Deposit Inflation Attack GriefingApxUSD Stablecoin · Quantstamp · 13 Feb 2026Mitigated

`ApyUSD` overrides `_decimalsOffset()` to return `0`. OpenZeppelin documents that this default makes the classic first-depositor inflation attack unprofitable: the `+1` virtual term in the share conversion captures ~50% of any donation, so the attacker’s expected gains are offset. A malicious actor can still grief users by depositing `1` wei, donating more than twice the victim’s deposit to the vault, and causing the victim’s `deposit()` to mint `0` shares (full loss for the victim at a net loss for the attacker). The issue affects the initial deposit phase when the vault is empty or nearly empty.

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