Grok Cat has 4 public audit reports from Cyberscope and CertiK; the latest is Cyberscope, 25 Jul 2025; no critical findings reported. It also holds 3 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
38 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 2 medium, 33 low (30 open, 8 acknowledged).
Centralization Related Risks
Grok Cat - Audit · CertiK · 5 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
Grok Cat - Audit · CertiK · 5 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
BabyGrok - Audit · CertiK · 24 Nov 2023 · Report ↗
Untitled finding
Baby Grok · Cyberscope · 25 Jul 2025 · Report ↗
Misuse of `sellTaxes` in `_transfer()` Function
Grok Cat - Audit · CertiK · 5 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Untitled finding
Baby Grok · Cyberscope · 25 Jul 2025 · Report ↗
Untitled finding
Baby Grok · Cyberscope · 25 Jul 2025 · Report ↗
Untitled finding
Baby Grok · Cyberscope · 25 Jul 2025 · Report ↗
Untitled finding
Baby Grok · Cyberscope · 25 Jul 2025 · Report ↗
Untitled finding
Baby Grok · Cyberscope · 25 Jul 2025 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baby Grok | Security firm: Cyberscope | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 1 medium · 13 low 14 open | cyberscope.io ↗ |
| Grok Cat - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 1 medium · 5 low 8 acknowledged | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| BabyGrok - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 9 low 2 fixed · 9 open | Original removed |
| Baby Grok | Security firm: Cyberscope | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 7 low 7 open | cyberscope.io ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Medium | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 28 | 5 | 1 |
All of the `BabyGrok` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThere are some hardcode addresses in this codebase. If not configured properly, this can cause side effects on the contract.
Open the reportThe official website states that a percentage of every transaction is burned, reducing the total supply and increasing the scarcity of Baby Grok over time. However, the fee of a normal transfer is zero, which does not align with the description on the website.
Open the reportThe `transferFrom()` reduce the allowance directly without checking the allowance.
Open the reportThe current contract is vulnerable to [a known ERC20 race condition issue](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729), which could lead to token theft. When a user calls `approve()` for a second time on a spender that has already been allowed, the spender could call `transferFrom()` to transfer the previous value and still receive the authorization to transfer the new value. Exploit scenario: 1. Alice calls `approve(Bob, 100)` to allow Bob to spend 100 tokens. 2. Alice changes her mind and calls `approve(Bob, 50)`. 3. Bob observes the second `approve(Bob, 50)` function call and calls `transferFrom(Alice, Bob, 100)` before the second `approve(Bob, 50)` call. 4. The above scenario can be achieved by front-running. In this case, Bob can transfer another 50 tokens from Alice and in total, he transferred 150 tokens from Alice.
Open the reportA sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `swapRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(...)`
Open the reportState variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=180 uint256 private buyAllocation = 40; ``` - `buyAllocation` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=181 uint256 private sellAllocation = 40; ``` - `sellAllocation` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=182 uint256 private liquidityAllocation = 20; ``` - `liquidityAllocation` should be declared `constant`.
Open the reportThe smart contract does not check or store the return value of an external call in a local or state variable, which may introduce vulnerabilities due to the unhandled outcome. ```solidity=387 try swapRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: newBalance}( address(this), secondMath, 0, 0, DEAD, block.timestamp ){} catch {return;} ```
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x3303…660e0x3303113001c51769f2753c2afb7b5a6d0535660e | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x4615…014b0x4615c8e2db74517a34712c9bdea5c418d999014b | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x88da…e2950x88da9901b3a02fe24e498e1ed683d2310383e295 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 4 public audit reports for Grok Cat, dated 20 Nov 2023 to 25 Jul 2025. The latest is by Cyberscope (“Baby Grok”).
2 security firms wrote the reports Trustblock holds for Grok Cat: Cyberscope and CertiK.
38 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 2 medium, 33 low (30 open, 8 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="baby-grok"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us