BetFin audit reports

Ethereum, Polygon (POS)betfin.ioX

BetFin has 4 public audit reports from CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 10 Dec 2024; 2 critical findings, all marked fixed by the firms.

Critical findings
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Across the 4 reports, 3 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm8

Statuses are the security firms’ own

8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (6 open, 2 acknowledged).

High
2
Low
6
  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Related Risks

    Liro - contract · CertiK · 10 Dec 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    Betfin Lucky Round Contracts · CertiK · 1 Aug 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Confirmation of `allowedToWin` of `MultiPlayerTab

    Liro - contract · CertiK · 10 Dec 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Third-Party Dependency Usage

    Betfin Stones Contracts · CertiK · 23 Sep 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Unpredictable `block.timestamp` in `getCurrentRou

    Betfin Stones Contracts · CertiK · 23 Sep 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Integer Division Will Lock a Small Portion of Tok

    Betfin Lucky Round Contracts · CertiK · 1 Aug 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Purpose of `requestCalculation` Function

    Betfin Lucky Round Contracts · CertiK · 1 Aug 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Third-Party Dependency Usage

    Betfin Lucky Round Contracts · CertiK · 1 Aug 2024 · Report ↗

Audits4

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Liro - contractSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listed1 critical finding, fixedFindings: 1 critical · 4 high · 1 medium · 9 low
13 fixed · 2 acknowledged
skynet.certik.com ↗
Betfin Stones ContractsSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 1 medium · 9 low
8 fixed · 2 open
skynet.certik.com ↗
Betfin Lucky Round ContractsSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listed1 critical finding, fixedFindings: 1 critical · 1 high · 9 low
7 fixed · 4 open
skynet.certik.com ↗
Betfin Core ContractsSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listed1 critical finding, fixedFindings: 1 critical · 6 high · 17 medium · 34 low
35 fixed · 23 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings36

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical002
High113
Medium002
Low5121
HighCentralization Related RisksBetfin Lucky Round Contracts · CertiK · 1 Aug 2024Open

In the contract `LuckyRound` the role `TIMELOCK` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. - `addService()`: This function allows adding a new address to the `SERVICE` role. - `setMinBetAmount()`: This function sets the minimum amount required to place a bet. Any compromise to the `TIMELOCK` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and could potentially add malicious addresses to the `SERVICE` role, enabling further unauthorized actions within the contract. And an attacker could adjust the minimum bet amount to either a prohibitively high or trivially low value, disrupting normal betting activities and potentially manipulating betting outcomes to their advantage. In the contract `LuckyRound` the role `SERVICE` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. - `claimBonus()`: This function allows claiming bonuses accrued to a player's account. Any compromise to the `SERVICE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. Additionally, the `LuckyRound` contract inherits the `AccessControl` contract from OpenZeppelin, the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` role has the following authorities within the contract: - `grantRole()`: Grants specified roles to an account, allowing it to perform actions associated with that role. - `revokeRole()`: Removes specified roles from an account, restricting it from performing certain actions. If the `DEFAULT_ADMIN ROLE` is compromised, an attacker could grant critical roles to unauthorized addresses, effectively allowing them to manipulate the contract. The attacker could also revoke roles from legitimate addresses, disrupting the normal operation and administration of the contract.

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LowThird-Party Dependency UsageBetfin Stones Contracts · CertiK · 23 Sep 2024Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. --- ```solidity=50 StakingInterface public immutable staking; ``` - The contract `Stones` interacts with third party contract with `StakingInterface` interface via `staking`. --- ```solidity=51 CoreInterface public immutable core; ``` - The contract `Stones` interacts with third party contract with `CoreInterface` interface via `core`. --- ```solidity uint256 private immutable created; uint256 private immutable subscriptionId; address public immutable vrfCoordinator; bytes32 public immutable keyHash; uint32 private constant callbackGasLimit = 2_500_000; uint16 public constant requestConfirmations = 3; uint32 private constant numWords = 1; constructor( uint256 _subscriptionId, address _core, address _staking, address _vrfCoordinator, bytes32 _keyHash, address _admin ) VRFConsumerBaseV2Plus(_vrfCoordinator) { // validation for vrf coordinator is not needed because it is already validated in the VRFConsumerBaseV2Plus contract vrfCoordinator = _vrfCoordinator; keyHash = _keyHash; subscriptionId = _subscriptionId; core = CoreInterface(_core); require(core.isStaking(_staking), "ST06"); staking = StakingInterface(_staking); created = block.timestamp; _grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, _admin); } ``` Since they are immutable or constant, the project team needs to ensure that the `vrfCoordinator` is always callable, and that the `keyHash` and `subscriptionId` are always valid, as well as that the `callbackGasLimit` is sufficient to execute the `rawFulfillRandomWords()` callback. In particular, the project team needs to prevent the risk of request failures caused by an invalid `subscriptionId`. It means the project team need to ensure that the request sent by calling `requestRandomWords()` in each round correctly triggers the callback.

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LowUnpredictable `block.timestamp` in `getCurrentRouBetfin Stones Contracts · CertiK · 23 Sep 2024Open

The `getCurrentRound()` function calculates the current round based on the current `block.timestamp`, and its result is compared with the `_round` provided in the calldata. However, the `block.timestamp` at the time of transaction execution is unpredictable.

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LowInteger Division Will Lock a Small Portion of TokBetfin Lucky Round Contracts · CertiK · 1 Aug 2024Open

```solidity=268 uint256 playerBonus = (bonus * playerShare) / bonusShares; ``` Due to integer division, it may be that not all BOUNS tokens can be claimed by users, ultimately leading to a small amount of BOUNS tokens being locked in the contract.

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LowPurpose of `requestCalculation` FunctionBetfin Lucky Round Contracts · CertiK · 1 Aug 2024Open

If the number of players placing bets within the `ROUND_DURATION` does not reach the `BETS_LIMIT`, any user can use the `requestCalculation()` function to complete the random number request, execute the results, and distribute the rewards. However, because the `winnerOffset` is randomly generated, there is insufficient incentive for users to actively call `requestCalculation()`.

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LowThird-Party Dependency UsageBetfin Lucky Round Contracts · CertiK · 1 Aug 2024Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=38 address public immutable core; ``` - The contract `LuckyRound` interacts with third party contract with `CoreInterface` interface via `core`. --- ```solidity=95 address _core, ``` - The function `LuckyRound.constructor` interacts with third party contract with `CoreInterface` interface via `_core`. --- ```solidity uint256 private immutable subscriptionId; address public immutable vrfCoordinator; bytes32 public immutable keyHash; uint32 private constant callbackGasLimit = 2_500_000; constructor( address _core, address _staking, address _admin, uint256 _subscriptionId, address _vrfCoordinator, bytes32 _keyHash ) VRFConsumerBaseV2Plus(_vrfCoordinator) { require(_vrfCoordinator != address(0), "RO01"); vrfCoordinator = _vrfCoordinator; keyHash = _keyHash; subscriptionId = _subscriptionId; created = block.timestamp; core = _core; token = CoreInterface(_core).token(); require(CoreInterface(_core).isStaking(_staking), "L01"); staking = _staking; fee = CoreInterface(core).fee(); _grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, _admin); } ``` Since they are immutable or constant, the project team needs to ensure that the `vrfCoordinator` is always callable, and that the `keyHash` and `subscriptionId` are always valid, as well as that the `callbackGasLimit` is sufficient to execute the `rawFulfillRandomWords()` callback. In particular, the project team needs to prevent the risk of request failures caused by an invalid `subscriptionId`.It means the project team need to ensure that the request sent by calling `requestRandomWords()` in each round correctly triggers the callback.

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Contracts

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The repositories and files the reports name

BetFin: questions

Is BetFin audited?

Trustblock holds 4 public audit reports for BetFin, dated 20 May 2024 to 10 Dec 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Liro - contract”).

Who audited BetFin?

CertiK wrote the 4 reports Trustblock holds for BetFin.

Are there open findings in BetFin’s audits?

8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (6 open, 2 acknowledged). Of 2 critical findings: all marked fixed by the firms. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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