As of 14 Oct 2026, Binemon has 2 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 11 Nov 2022. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Statuses are the security firms’ own. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple(AMB)-Binemon NFT | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Binemon | Security firm: SolidProof | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | No open critical findings | Open · IPFS |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Medium | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 14 | 0 | 0 |
In the contract `Apple` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify contract configurations.  In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify contract configurations. 
Open the reportAll of the **AMB** tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.
Open the reportAn owner is possible to gain ownership of the contract even if he calls function `renounceOwnership()` to renounce the ownership. This can be achieved by performing the following operations: 1. Call `timelock()` to lock the contract. The variable `_previousOwner` is set to the current owner. 2. Call `untimelock()` to unlock the contract. 3. Call `renounceOwnership()` to leave the contract without an owner. 4. Call `untimelock()` to regain ownership.
Open the reportThe function below has a known bug. ```solidity function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner() { require(_isExcluded[account], "Account is already excluded"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) { if (_excluded[i] == account) { _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1]; _tOwned[account] = 0; _isExcluded[account] = false; _excluded.pop(); break; } } } ``` Variable `_rOwned[account]` is not updated in the function `includeInReward()`, which will make the accounts included siphon off the tokens out of the balances of all token holders.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x9597…30d40x95977a9daa14a00258f89a14f75b6e35d5b730d4 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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