Bitonite audit reports

Bitonite has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 10 Jan 2024; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm7

Statuses are the security firms’ own

7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 4 low (all open).

High
3
Low
4
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    Bitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade

    Bitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    Bitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incompatibility With Deflationary Tokens (Non-sta

    Bitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Lack of Storage Gap in Upgradeable Contract

    Bitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Potential for Disproportionate Rewards in New Poo

    Bitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Unprotected Initializers

    Bitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
BitoniteSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 3 high · 4 low
7 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High300
Medium000
Low400
HighCentralization Related RisksBitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024Open

In the contract `OwnableUpgradeable` the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - transferOwnership() - renounceOwnership() Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer or renounce the ownership. --- In the contract `BitToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the `beneficiary` addresses and transfer tokens to them. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9453-814cbb30-82b0-3d0e5b16b63e/diagrams/centralization_BitToken-BitToken-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `RewardsDistributor` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the `rewardsTracker` address and withdraw tokens from the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9453-814cbb30-82b0-3d0e5b16b63e/diagrams/centralization_RewardsDistributor-RewardsDistributor-_owner.svg) In the contract `RewardsDistributor` the role `rewardsTracker` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `rewardsTracker` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer `token` from the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9453-814cbb30-82b0-3d0e5b16b63e/diagrams/centralization_RewardsDistributor-RewardsDistributor-rewardsTracker.svg) ----- In the contract `Staking` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the reward provider, set the rewards burn rate (which can be up to 100%), add/update pools, and pause/unpause the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9453-814cbb30-82b0-3d0e5b16b63e/diagrams/centralization_Staking-Staking-_owner.svg) ----- In the contracts `LockBit` and `VestingBase`, the role `_owner` has authority over the following function: - setBeneficiary() Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the `beneficiary` address. --- In the contracts `LockBit`, `Vesting`, and `VestingTge`, the role `beneficiary` has authority over the following function: - claim() Any compromise to the `beneficiary` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer tokens from the contract.

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeBitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024Open

The following contracts serve as implementation contracts behind the proxy contracts: - LockBit - Vesting - VestingTge - BitToken - RewardsDistributor - Staking The proxy admins have the authority to update the implementation contracts behind the proxy contracts. Any compromise to the proxy admins may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract. For example, the staked tokens in the `Staking` contract can be swept out.

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HighInitial Token DistributionBitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024Open

All of the BIT tokens will be sent to `beneficiary` addresses. This is a centralization risk because the addresses can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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LowIncompatibility With Deflationary Tokens (Non-staBitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024Open

The project design may not be compatible with non-standard ERC20 tokens, such as deflationary tokens or rebase tokens.

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LowLack of Storage Gap in Upgradeable ContractBitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024Open

There is no storage gap preserved in the logic contract `VestingBase`. Any logic contract that acts as a base contract inherited by other upgradeable contracts should have a reasonable size of storage gap preserved for potential new state variables introduced in future upgrades. Otherwise, there could be potential storage slot collision.

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LowPotential for Disproportionate Rewards in New PooBitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024Open

The `_addPool()` function in the contract is responsible for adding new pools. It utilizes the `_mintStartBlock` parameter to set the initial block number for staking rewards. If this parameter is set to a very low number, such as 1, it could lead to a situation where the first staker in the new pool could claim an excessively large amount of rewards. This is because the rewards calculation would consider all the blocks from the `_mintStartBlock` to the current block, leading to a substantial reward accumulation for the initial blocks. The `setPoolInfo()` function shares the same issue. If an existing pool is updated with the `_mintStartBlock` parameter setting to a very low number, the stakers in the pool can get a lot of rewards. ```solidity=277 function _addPool( address _token, uint256 _rewardPerBlock, uint64 _cooldownPeriod, uint64 _mintStartBlock ) internal { if (_mintStartBlock == 0) { _mintStartBlock = _getBlockNumber(); } require(_rewardPerBlock != 0, "!rewardPerBlock"); poolTokens.push(_token); poolInfo[_token] = PoolInfo({ id: poolTokens.length.toUint64(), rewardPerBlock: _rewardPerBlock, lastRewardBlock: _mintStartBlock, cooldownPeriod: _cooldownPeriod, totalDeposits: 0, accPalmPerShare: 0 }); emit PoolUpdate( _token, poolTokens.length.toUint64(), _rewardPerBlock, _cooldownPeriod, _mintStartBlock ); } ```

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LowUnprotected InitializersBitonite · CertiK · 10 Jan 2024Open

The following logic contracts do not protect their initializers. An attacker can call the initializers and assume ownership of the logic contracts, whereby she can perform privileged operations that trick unsuspecting users into believing that she is the owner of the upgradeable contracts. ```solidity=8 contract BitToken is IBitToken, ERC20PermitUpgradeable, OwnableUpgradeable { ``` - `BitToken` is an upgradeable contract that does not protect its initializer. ```solidity=24 function initialize() external initializer { ``` - `initialize` is an unprotected initializer function. --- ```solidity=8 contract RewardsDistributor is IRewardsDistributor, OwnableUpgradeable { ``` - `RewardsDistributor` is an upgradeable contract that does not protect its initializer. ```solidity=16 function initialize(address _token, address _rewardsTracker) external initializer { ``` - `initialize` is an unprotected initializer function. --- ```solidity=12 contract Staking is OwnableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable, PausableUpgradeable { ``` - `Staking` is an upgradeable contract that does not protect its initializer. ```solidity=66 function initialize( ``` - `initialize` is an unprotected initializer function. --- ```solidity=7 contract LockBit is OwnableUpgradeable { ``` - `LockBit` is an upgradeable contract that does not protect its initializer. ```solidity=21 function initialize( ``` - `initialize` is an unprotected initializer function. --- ```solidity=7 contract Vesting is VestingBase { ``` - `Vesting` is an upgradeable contract that does not protect its initializer. ```solidity=17 function initialize( ``` - `initialize` is an unprotected initializer function. --- ```solidity=7 contract VestingTge is VestingBase { ``` - `VestingTge` is an upgradeable contract that does not protect its initializer. ```solidity=18 function initialize( ``` - `initialize` is an unprotected initializer function.

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Bitonite: questions

Is Bitonite audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Bitonite, dated 10 Jan 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Bitonite”).

Who audited Bitonite?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Bitonite.

Are there open findings in Bitonite’s audits?

7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 4 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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